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Abstract
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped
with a tree structure so that the preferences of each voter are decreasing from their top
candidate along all paths in the tree. This notion was introduced by Demange (1982), and
subsequently Trick (1989b) described an efficient algorithm for deciding if a given profile is
single-peaked on a tree. We study the complexity of multiwinner elections under several
variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule for preferences single-peaked on trees. We show
that the egalitarian version of this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm. For the
utilitarian version, we prove that winner determination remains NP-hard, even for the Borda
scoring function; however, a winning committee can be found in polynomial time if either
the number of leaves or the number of internal vertices of the underlying tree is bounded by
a constant. To benefit from these positive results, we need a procedure that can determine
whether a given profile is single-peaked on a tree that has additional desirable properties
(such as, e.g., a small number of leaves). To address this challenge, we develop a structural
approach that enables us to compactly represent all trees with respect to which a given
profile is single-peaked. We show how to use this representation to efficiently find the best
tree for a given profile for use with our winner determination algorithms: Given a profile, we
can efficiently find a tree with the minimum number of leaves, or a tree with the minimum
number of internal vertices among trees on which the profile is single-peaked. We also
consider several other optimization criteria for trees: for some we obtain polynomial-time
algorithms, while for others we show NP-hardness results.
1. Introduction
Computational social choice deals with algorithmic aspects of collective decision-making.
One of the fundamental questions studied in this area is the complexity of determining the
election winner(s) for voting rules: indeed, for a rule to be practically applicable, it has to
be the case that we can find the winner of an election in a reasonable amount of time.
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Most common rules that are designed to output a single winner admit polynomial-
time winner determination algorithms; examples include such diverse rules as Plurality,
Borda, Maximin, Copeland, and Bucklin (see, e.g., Arrow et al., 2002, for definitions).
However, there are also some intuitively appealing single-winner rules for which winner
determination is known to be computationally hard: this is the case, for instance, for
Dodgson’s rule (Bartholdi et al., 1989; Hemaspaandra et al., 1997), Young’s rule (Rothe
et al., 2003), and Kemeny’s rule (Hemaspaandra et al., 2005). More recently, there has been
much interest in the computational complexity of voting rules whose purpose is to elect
a representative committee of candidates rather than select a single winner (Faliszewski
et al., 2017). While one can adapt common single-winner rules to this setting (e.g., appoint
the candidates with the top k scores, where k is the target committee size, or split the
voters into k districts and determine the winner in each district using a single-winner rule),
this approach may result in a committee that does not reflect the true preferences of the
electorate (see, e.g., Betzler et al., 2013). Therefore, it is preferable to use a voting rule that
is specifically designed for multi-winner elections.
One such rule was proposed by Chamberlin and Courant (1983). Given a committee A
of k candidates, the rule assumes that each voter i is represented by her most-preferred
candidate in A, that is, the member of A ranked highest in her preferences. Voter i is
assumed to obtain utility from this representation. This utility is non-decreasing in the rank
of her representative in her preference ranking. For example, her utility could be obtained
as the Borda score she assigns to her representative (i.e., the number of candidates she
ranks below that representative), but other scoring functions can be used as well. There
are no constraints on the number of voters that can be represented by a single candidate;
the assumption is that the committee will make its decisions by weighted voting, where
the weight of each candidate is proportional to the fraction of the electorate that she
represents. Given a target committee size k, Chamberlin and Courant’s scheme outputs a
size-k committee that maximizes the sum of voters’ utilities according to the chosen scoring
function (see Section 2 for a formal definition).1 Subsequently, Betzler et al. (2013) suggested
an egalitarian, or maximin, variant, where the quality of a committee is measured by the
utility of the worst-off voter rather than the sum of individual utilities.
Unfortunately, the problem of identifying an optimal committee under the Chamberlin–
Courant rule is known to be computationally hard, even for fairly simple scoring functions.
In particular, Procaccia et al. (2008) show that this is the case for both schemes under
r-approval scoring functions, where a voter obtains utility 1 if her representative is one
of her r highest-ranked candidates, and utility 0 otherwise. Lu and Boutilier (2011) give
an NP-hardness proof for the Chamberlin–Courant rule under the Borda scoring function.
Betzler et al. (2013) extend these hardness results to the egalitarian variant.
Clearly, this is bad news if we want to use the Chamberlin–Courant rule in practice:
elections may involve millions of voters and hundreds of candidates, and the election outcome
needs to be announced soon after the votes have been cast. On the other hand, simply
abandoning these voting rules in favor of easy-to-compute adaptations of single-winner
rules is not acceptable if the goal is to select a truly representative committee. Thus, it is
1. Monroe (1995) has subsequently proposed a variant of this scheme where the committee is assumed
to use non-weighted voting, and, consequently, each member of the committee is required to represent
approximately the same number of voters (up to a rounding error).
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natural to try to circumvent the hardness results, either by designing efficient algorithms
that compute an approximately optimal committee or by identifying reasonable assumptions
on the structure of the election that ensure computational tractability. The former approach
was initiated by Lu and Boutilier (2011), and subsequently Skowron et al. (2015a) have
developed algorithms with strong approximation guarantees; see the survey by Faliszewski
et al. (2017). The latter approach was proposed by Betzler et al. (2013), who provide an
extensive analysis of the fixed-parameter tractability of the winner determination problem
under both utilitarian and egalitarian variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule. They also
investigate the complexity of this problem for single-peaked electorates.
A profile is said to be single-peaked (Black, 1958) if the set of candidates can be placed
on a one-dimensional axis, so that a voter prefers candidates that are close to her top
choice on the axis. We can expect a profile to be single-peaked when every voter evaluates
the candidates according to their position on a numerical issue, such as the income tax
rate or minimum wage level, or by their position on the left-right ideological axis. Many
voting-related problems that are known to be computationally hard for general preferences
become easy when voters’ preferences are assumed to be single-peaked (Elkind et al., 2017).
For instance, this is the case for the winner determination problem under Dodgson’s, Young’s
and Kemeny’s rules (Brandt et al., 2015). Betzler et al. (2013) show that this is also the
case for winner determination of both the utilitarian and the egalitarian version of the
Chamberlin–Courant rule.
Our Contribution The goal of this paper is to investigate whether the easiness results
of Betzler et al. (2013) for single-peaked electorates can be extended to a more general class
of profiles. To this end, we explore a generalization of single-peaked preferences introduced
by Demange (1982), which captures a much broader class of voters’ preferences, while still
implying the existence of a Condorcet winner. This is the class of preference profiles that are
single-peaked on a tree. Informally, an election belongs to this class if we can construct a tree
whose vertices are candidates in the election, and each voter ranks all candidates according
to their perceived distance along this tree from her most-preferred candidate, with closer
candidates preferred to those who are further away. A profile is single-peaked if and only if
it is single-peaked on a path. Preferences that are single-peaked on a tree arise naturally
in the context of choosing a location for a facility (such as a hospital or a convenience
store) given an acyclic road network; further examples are provided by Demange (1982).
Moreover, this preference domain is a natural and well-studied extension of the single-peaked
domain, and checking if the algorithms of Betzler et al. (2013) extend to preferences that
are single-peaked on trees helps us understand whether the single-dimensional structure is
essential for tractability; as we will see, it turns out that the answer to this question is ‘no’.
We focus on the Chamberlin–Courant rule. We first show that, for the egalitarian variant
of this rule, winner determination is easy for an arbitrary scoring function when voters’
preferences are single-peaked on a tree. Our proof proceeds by reducing our problem to an
easy variant of the Hitting Set problem. For the utilitarian setting, we show that winner
determination for the Chamberlin–Courant rule is NP-complete, even for the Borda scoring
function. Hardness holds even if preferences are single-peaked on a tree of bounded diameter
and bounded pathwidth. However, we present an efficient winner determination algorithm
for preferences that are single-peaked on a tree with a small number of leaves: the running
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time of our algorithm is polynomial in the size of the profile, but exponential in the number
of leaves. Formally, the problem is in XP with respect to the number of leaves. Further, we
give an algorithm that works for trees with a small number of internal vertices (i.e., with a
large number of leaves) when using the Borda scoring function. This algorithm places the
problem in XP with respect to the number of internal vertices and in FPT with respect to
the combined parameter ‘committee size+the number of internal vertices’.
Now, these parameterized algorithms assume that the tree with respect to which the
preferences are single-peaked is given as an input. However, in practice we cannot expect
this to be the case: typically, we are only given the voters’ preferences and have to construct
such a tree (if it exists) ourselves. While the algorithm of Betzler et al. faces the same issue
(i.e., it needs to know the societal axis), there exist efficient algorithms for determining the
societal axis given the voters’ preferences (Bartholdi & Trick, 1986; Doignon & Falmagne,
1994; Escoffier et al., 2008). In contrast, for trees the situation is more complicated. Trick
(1989b) describes a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether there exists a tree such
that a given election is single-peaked with respect to it, and constructs some such tree if this
is indeed the case. However, Trick’s algorithm leaves us a lot of freedom when constructing
the tree; as a result, if the election is single-peaked with respect to several different trees, the
output of Trick’s algorithm will be dependent on the implementation details. In particular,
there is no guarantee that an arbitrary implementation will find a tree that caters to the
demands of the winner determination algorithms that we present: for example, the algorithm
may return a tree with many leaves, while we wish to find one that has as few leaves as
possible. Indeed, Trick’s algorithm may output a complex tree even when the input profile
is single-peaked on a line.
To address this issue, we propose a general framework for finding trees with desired
properties, and use it to obtain polynomial-time algorithms for identifying ‘nice’ trees when
they exist, for several appealing notions of ‘niceness’. Specifically, we define a digraph that
encodes, in a compact fashion, all trees with respect to which a given profile is single-peaked.
This digraph enables us to count and/or enumerate all such trees. Moreover, we show that
it has many useful structural properties. These properties can be exploited to efficiently
find trees with the minimum number of leaves, or the number of internal vertices, or the
degree, or diameter, or pathwidth, among all trees with respect to which a given profile is
single-peaked. These recognition algorithms complement our parameterized algorithms for
winner determination. However, not all interesting questions about finding special trees are
easy to solve. In particular, we show that it is NP-hard to decide whether a given profile
is single-peaked on a regular tree, i.e., a tree all of whose internal vertices have the same
degree. It is also NP-complete to decide whether a profile is single-peaked on a tree which is
isomorphic to a given tree.
Related Work The recent literature on the use of structured preferences in computational
social choice is surveyed by Elkind et al. (2016, 2017).
Demange (1982) introduced the domain of preferences single-peaked on a tree and
showed that every profile in this domain admits a Condorcet winner. Thus, there exists
a strategyproof voting rule on this domain. Danilov (1994) characterized the set of all
strategyproof voting rules on this domain, generalizing the classic characterization for
preferences single-peaked on a line by Moulin (1980). Schummer and Vohra (2002) consider
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strategyproofness for the case where the tree is embedded in R2 and preferences are Euclidean.
Peters et al. (2019) characterize strategyproof probabilistic voting rules for preferences single-
peaked on trees and other graphs. The domain of single-crossing preferences (Mirrlees, 1971;
Roberts, 1977) has also been extended to trees and other graphs (Kung, 2015; Clearwater
et al., 2015; Puppe & Slinko, 2019).
A polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing whether a profile is single-peaked on a line
was given by Bartholdi and Trick (1986); subsequently, faster algorithms were developed
by Doignon and Falmagne (1994) and Escoffier et al. (2008). Fitzsimmons and Lackner
(2020) put forward an efficient algorithm for preferences that may contain ties. For single-
peakedness on trees, Trick (1989b) gives an algorithm that we describe in detail later. Trick’s
algorithm only works when voters’ preferences are strict; for preferences that may contain
ties, more complicated algorithms have been proposed (Trick, 1989a; Conitzer et al., 2004;
Tarjan & Yannakakis, 1984; Sheng Bao & Zhang, 2012). Peters and Lackner (2020) give a
polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing preferences single-peaked on a circle; very recently,
these results have been extended to pseudotrees (Escoffier et al., 2020). On the other
hand, a result of Gottlob and Greco (2013) implies that recognizing whether preferences are
single-peaked on a graph of treewidth 3 is NP-hard.
The complexity of winner determination under the Chamberlin–Courant rule has been
investigated by a number of authors, starting with the work of Procaccia et al. (2008) and Lu
and Boutilier (2011); see the survey of Faliszewski et al. (2017). The first paper to consider
this problem for a structured preference domain was the work of Betzler et al. (2013), who
gave a dynamic programming algorithm for single-peaked preferences. This result was
extended by Cornaz et al. (2012) to profiles with bounded single-peaked width. Skowron
et al. (2015b) show that a winning committee under the Chamberlin–Courant rule can be
computed in polynomial time for preferences that are single-crossing, or, more generally,
have bounded single-crossing width. Peters and Lackner (2020) develop a polynomial-time
winner determination algorithm for profiles that are single-peaked on a circle, via an integer
linear program that is totally unimodular if preferences are single-peaked on a circle, and
hence optimally solved by its linear programming relaxation. The computational complexity
of the winner determination problem under structured preferences has also been studied for
other voting rules: for example, Brandt et al. (2015) consider the complexity of the Dodgson
rule and the Kemeny rule under single-peaked preferences.
Conitzer (2009) showed that single-peakedness offers advantages if we wish to elicit
voters’ preferences using comparison queries: Without knowing about any structure in
the preferences, one requires Ω(nm logm) comparison queries to discover the preferences
of n voters over m alternatives. If preferences are known to be single-peaked on a line,
then O(nm) queries suffice. Dey and Misra (2016) show that single-peakedness on trees
can also be used to speed up elicitation, as long as we know the underlying tree and this
tree is well-structured (the relevant notions of structure are similar to the ones considered
in Section 8). Sliwinski and Elkind (2019) consider the problem of sampling preferences
that are single-peaked on a given tree uniformly at random, and explain how to identify a
tree that is most likely to generate a given profile, assuming that preferences are sampled
uniformly at random.
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2. Preliminaries
Let C be a finite set of candidates, and let C! be the set of strict total orders over C. Let
N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of voters. A preference profile P : N → C! maps each voter to a
preference order over C. If the profile P is clear from the context, then for each i ∈ N we
write i for the preference order P (i), and if a i b, then we say that voter i prefers a to b.
Given a profile P , we denote by pos(i, c) the position of candidate c ∈ C in the preference
order of voter i ∈ N :
pos(i, c) = |{c′ ∈ C : c′ i c}|+ 1.
We write top(i) for voter i’s most-preferred candidate, i.e., the candidate in position 1,
we write second(i) for the candidate in position 2, and bottom(i) for i’s least-preferred
candidate, i.e., the candidate in position m. Given a subset of candidates W ⊆ C, we
extend this notation and let top(i,W ), second(i,W ), and bottom(i,W ) denote voter i’s
most-, second-most- and least-preferred candidate in W , respectively, provided that |W | > 3.
Given a subset W ⊆ C, we write P |W for the profile obtained from P by restricting the
candidate set to W .
Multi-Winner Elections A scoring function for given N and C is a mapping µ : N×C →
Z such that pos(i, c) < pos(i, c′) implies µ(i, c) > µ(i, c′). Intuitively, µ(i, c) indicates how
well candidate c represents voter i. A scoring function is said to be positional if there exists
a vector s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Zm with s1 > s2 > . . . > sm such that µ(i, c) = spos(i,c); when
this is the case, we will say that the scoring function is induced by the vector s. It will be
convenient to work with vectors s such that s1 = 0 and s2, . . . , sm 6 0, where negative values
correspond to ‘misrepresentation’. This choice is without loss of generality, as applying
a positive affine transformation to s does not change the output of the voting rules we
introduce below. We will refer to the positional scoring function that corresponds to the
vector (0,−1, . . . ,−m+ 1) as the Borda scoring function.
Given a preference profile P , a committee of candidates W ⊆ C, and a scoring function
µ : N × C → Z, we take voter i’s utility from the committee W to be µ(i, top(i,W )), that
is, the score she gives to her favorite candidate in W . We also write
m+µ (P,W ) =
∑
i∈N
µ(i, top(i,W ))
for the sum of the utilities of all voters (the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant score), and
mminµ (P,W ) = min
i∈N
µ(i, top(i,W ))
for the utility obtained by the worst-off voter (the egalitarian Chamberlin–Courant score).
Given a committee size k with 1 6 k 6 |C|, the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant rule elects
all committees W ⊆ C with |W | = k such that m+µ (P,W ) is maximum. The egalitarian
Chamberlin–Courant rule elects all committees W ⊆ C with |W | = k such that mminµ (P,W )
is maximum. When referring to the Chamberlin–Courant rule, we will mean the utilitarian
version by default.
To study the computation of winning committees under these rules, we now formally
define the decision problems associated with their optimization versions.
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(a) Star (b) Caterpillar (c) Subdivision of a star
Figure 1: Examples of different classes of trees
Definition 2.1. An instance of the Utilitarian CC (respectively, Egalitarian CC)
problem is given by a preference profile P , a committee size k, 1 6 k 6 |C|, a scoring
function µ : N × C → Z, and a bound B ∈ Z. It is a ‘yes’-instance if there is a subset of
candidates W ⊆ C with |W | = k such that m+µ (P,W ) > B (respectively, mminµ (P,W ) > B)
and a ‘no’-instance otherwise.2
We will sometimes consider the complexity of these problems for specific families of
scoring functions. Note that a scoring function is defined for fixed C and N , so the question
of asymptotic complexity makes sense for families of scoring functions (parameterized by C
and N), but not for individual scoring functions. For instance, the Borda scoring function
can be viewed as a family of scoring functions, as it is well-defined for any C and N .
Graphs and Digraphs A digraph D = (C,A) is given by a set C of vertices and a set
A ⊆ C × C of pairs, which we call arcs. If (c, c′) ∈ A, we say that (c, c′) is an outgoing arc
of c. An acyclic digraph (a dag) is a digraph with no directed cycles. For a vertex c ∈ C, its
out-degree d+(c) = |{c′ ∈ C : (c, c′) ∈ A}| is the number of outgoing arcs of c. A sink is a
vertex c with d+(c) = 0, i.e., a vertex without outgoing arcs. It is easy to see that every dag
has at least one sink. Given a digraph D = (C,A), we write G(D) for the undirected graph
(C,E) where for all c, c′ ∈ C we have {c, c′} ∈ E if and only if (c, c′) ∈ A or (c′, c) ∈ A. Thus,
G(D) is the graph obtained from D when we forget about the orientations of the arcs of D.
Given a digraph D = (C,A) and a set W ⊆ C, we write D|W for the induced subdigraph.
Similarly, for a graph G = (C,E), we write G|W for the induced subgraph. We say that a
set W ⊆ C is connected in a graph G if G|W is connected.
Classes of Trees Recall that a tree is a connected graph that has no cycles. A leaf of a
tree is a vertex of degree 1. Vertices that are not leaves are internal vertices. A path is a
tree that has exactly two leaves. A star K1,n is a tree that has exactly one internal vertex
and n leaves; the internal vertex is called the center of the star. The diameter of a tree
T is the maximum distance between two vertices of T ; e.g., the diameter of a star is 2. A
2. Under our definition it may happen that some candidate in the committee does not represent any voter,
i.e., there exists a c′ ∈W such that c′ 6= top(i,W ) for all i ∈ N ; equivalently, we allow for committees
of size k′ < k. It is assumed that the voting weight of such candidate in the resulting committee will
be 0. This definition is also used by, e.g., Cornaz et al. (2012) and Skowron et al. (2015a). In contrast,
Betzler et al. (2013) define the Chamberlin–Courant rule by explicitly specifying an assignment of voters
to candidates, so that each candidate in W has at least one voter who is assigned to her. The resulting
voting rule is somewhat harder to analyze algorithmically. Note that when |{top(i, C) : i ∈ N}| > k, the
two variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule coincide.
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k-regular tree is a tree in which every internal vertex has degree k. Note that paths are
2-regular, and the star K1,n is n-regular. A caterpillar is a tree in which every vertex is
within distance 1 of a central path. A subdivision of a star is a tree obtained from a star by
means of replacing each edge by a path. Figure 1 illustrates some of these concepts.
Pathwidth The pathwidth of a tree T is a measure of how close T is to being a path. A
path decomposition of T = (C,E) is given by a sequence S1, . . . , Sr of subsets of C (called
bags) such that
• for each edge {a, b} ∈ E, there is a bag Si with a, b ∈ Si, and
• for each a ∈ C, the bags containing a form an interval of the sequence, so that if a ∈ Si
and a ∈ Sj for i < j, then a is also a member of Si+1, Si+2, . . . , Sj−1.
The width of the path decomposition is maxi∈[r] |Si|− 1. The pathwidth of T is the minimum
width of a path decomposition of T . For more on pathwidth and the related concept of
treewidth, see, e.g., the survey by Bodlaender (1994).
Preferences that are Single-Peaked on a Tree Consider a tree T with vertex set C.
A preference profile P is said to be single-peaked on T (Demange, 1982) if for every voter
i ∈ N and every pair of distinct candidates a, b ∈ C such that b lies on the unique path from
top(i) to a in T it holds that top(i) i b i a. The profile P is said to be single-peaked on a
tree if there exists a tree T with vertex set C such that P is single-peaked on T . The profile
P is said to be single-peaked if P is single-peaked on some tree T that is a path.
The following proposition considers two alternative ways of defining preferences single-
peaked on a tree T . The (known) proof is straightforward from the definitions.
Proposition 2.2. Let P be a preference profile and let T be a tree on vertex set C. The
following properties are equivalent:
• P is single-peaked on T .
• For every W ⊆ C that is connected in T , P |W is single-peaked on T |W .
• For every i ∈ N and every a ∈ C, the top-initial segment {b ∈ C : b i a} is connected
in T .
Given a profile P , we denote the set of all trees T such that P is single-peaked on T by
T (P ).
3. Egalitarian Chamberlin–Courant on Arbitrary Trees
We start by presenting a simple algorithm for finding a winning committee under the
egalitarian Chamberlin–Courant rule that works for preferences single-peaked on arbitrary
trees. Our algorithm proceeds by finding a committee of minimum size that satisfies a given
worst-case utility bound.
First, we show that the winner determination problem in the egalitarian case can be
reduced to the following variant of the Hitting Set problem, where the ground set is the
vertex set of a tree T , and we need to hit a collection of connected subsets of T .
8
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Definition 3.1. An instance of the Tree Hitting Set problem is given by a tree T on a
vertex set C, a family C = {C1, . . . , Cn} of subsets of C such that each Ci is connected in T ,
and a target cover size k ∈ Z+. It is a ‘yes’-instance if there is a subset of vertices W ⊆ C
with |W | 6 k such that W ∩ Ci 6= ∅ for i = 1, . . . , n, and a ‘no’-instance otherwise.
Guo and Niedermeier (2006) show that the Tree Hitting Set problem can be solved in
polynomial time. Since they consider a dual formulation (in terms of set cover), we present
an adaptation of the short argument here.
Theorem 3.2 (Guo and Niedermeier (2006)). Tree Hitting Set can be solved in polyno-
mial time.
Proof. Consider a vertex a ∈ C that is a leaf of T , and let b ∈ C be the (unique) vertex that
a is adjacent to. Suppose that a ∈ Ci for some i. Then, because Ci is a connected subset of
T , we either have Ci = {a} or b ∈ Ci.
With this observation, we can now give a simple algorithm that constructs a minimum
hitting set: Consider a leaf vertex a ∈ C adjacent to b ∈ C. If there exists some Ci ∈ C with
Ci = {a}, then any hitting set must include a, so add a to the hitting set under construction,
remove a from T and remove all copies of {a} from C. Otherwise, every set Ci that would
be hit by a is also hit by b, so any hitting set including a remains a hitting set when a is
replaced by b. Hence it is safe to delete a from T and from each Ci ∈ C. Now repeat the
process on the smaller instance constructed. Once all vertices have been deleted, return the
constructed hitting set, which is minimum by our argument.
Now we show how to reduce our winner determination problem to the hitting set problem.
Suppose we are given an instance of the Egalitarian CC problem consisting of a profile
P , a tree T on which P is single-peaked, a target committee size k, and the bound B. We
construct a Tree Hitting Set instance as follows: The ground set is the candidate set C,
the tree T is the tree with respect to which voters’ preferences are single-peaked, and the
target cover size equals the committee size k. For each i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, construct the set
Ci = {a ∈ C : µ(i, a) > B}. Since µ is monotone, the set Ci is a top-initial segment of i’s
preference order, i.e., is of the form {a ∈ C : a i b} for some b ∈ C. By Proposition 2.2,
since P is single-peaked on T , each set Ci is connected in T , so we have constructed an
instance of Tree Hitting Set. Now note that for every set W ∈ C we have
mmaxµ (P,W ) > B if and only if W ∩ Ci = W ∩ {a ∈ C : µ(i, a) > B} 6= ∅ for all i.
It follows that our reduction is correct.
Using this reduction and the algorithm for Tree Hitting Set, we can solve Egalitar-
ian CC in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.3. For profiles that are single-peaked on a tree, we can find a winning committee
under the egalitarian Chamberlin–Courant rule in polynomial time.
4. Hardness of Utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant on Arbitrary Trees
For preferences single-peaked on a path, the utilitarian version of the Chamberlin–Courant
rule is computationally easy: a winning committee can be computed using a dynamic
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programming algorithm (Betzler et al., 2013). While we are able to generalize this algorithm
to work for some other trees (see Section 5), it is not clear how to extend it to arbitrary
trees. Indeed, we will now show that for the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant rule the winner
determination problem remains NP-complete for preferences single-peaked on a tree. This
hardness result holds even for the Borda scoring function, and even for trees that have
diameter 4 and pathwidth 2.
Theorem 4.1. Given a profile P that is single-peaked on a tree, a target committee size k,
and a target score B, it is NP-complete to decide whether there exists a committee of size k
with score at least B under the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant rule with the Borda scoring
function. Utilitarian CC is NP-complete, even for the Borda scoring function.
Proof. We will reduce the classic Vertex Cover problem to Utilitarian CC. Recall that
an instance of Vertex Cover is given by an undirected graph G = (V,E) and a positive
integer t; it is a ‘yes’-instance if it admits a vertex cover of size t, i.e., a subset of vertices
S ⊆ V such that for each {u, v} ∈ E we have that u ∈ S or v ∈ S. This problem is known
to be NP-hard (Garey & Johnson, 1979).
Given an instance (G, t) of Vertex Cover such that G = (V,E), V = {u1, . . . , up} and
E = {e1, . . . , eq}, we construct an instance of Utilitarian CC as follows.
Let M = 5pq; intuitively, M is a large number. We introduce a candidate a, two
candidates yi and zi for each vertex ui ∈ V , and M dummy candidates. Formally, we set
Y = {y1, . . . , yp}, Z = {z1, . . . , zp}, D = {d1, . . . , dM}, and define the candidate set to be
C = {a} ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪D. We set the target committee size to be k = p+ t.
We now introduce the voters, who will come in three types N = N1 ∪N2 ∪N3.
N1 N2 N3
5q · · · 5q 1 · · · 1 M · · · M
y1 yp a a z1 zp
z1 zp yj1,1 yjq,1 y1 yp
a a yj1,2 yjq,2 a a
...
... d1 d1
...
...
...
...
dM dM
...
...
• The set N1 consists of 5q identical voters for each ui ∈ V : they rank yi first, zi second,
and a third, followed by all other candidates as specified below. Intuitively, the purpose
of these voters is to ensure that good committees contain representatives yi of vertices
in V .
• The set N2 consists of a single voter for each edge ej ∈ E: this voter ranks a first,
followed by the two candidates from Y that correspond to the endpoints of ej (in an
arbitrary order), followed by the dummy candidates d1, . . . , dM , followed by all other
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candidates as specified below. The purpose of these voters is to ensure that every edge
is covered by one of the vertices that correspond to a committee member, and to incur
a heavy penalty of M if the edge is uncovered.
• The set N3 is a set of M identical voters for each ui ∈ V who all rank zi first, yi
second, and a third, followed by all other candidates as specified below. The purpose
of these voters is to force every good committee to include all the zi candidates.
We complete the voters’ preferences so that the resulting profile is single-peaked on the
following tree:
a
y1 · · · yp d1 · · · dM
z1 · · · zp
This tree is obtained by taking a star with center a and leaves Y ∪D, and then attaching zi
as a leaf onto yi for every i = 1, . . . , p. It is easy to see that it has diameter 4 and pathwidth
2. We will now specify how to complete each vote in our profile to ensure that the resulting
profile is single-peaked on this tree, Inspecting the tree, we see that it suffices to ensure that
for each i = 1, . . . , p it holds that in all votes where the positions of yi and zi are not given
explicitly, candidate yi is ranked above zi.
This completes the construction of the profile P with voter set N and candidate set C.
We set the utility bound to be B = −(5q)(p− t)− 2q (note that, by construction, −M < B).
Intuitively, the ‘correct committee’ we have in mind consists of all zi candidates (of
which there are p) and a selection of yi candidates that corresponds to a vertex cover
(of which there should be t), should a vertex cover of size t exist. This completes the
description of our instance of the Utilitarian CC problem with the Borda scoring function
s = (0,−1,−2, . . . ). Now let us prove that the reduction is correct.
Suppose we have started with a ‘yes’-instance of Vertex Cover, and let S be a collection
of t vertices that form a vertex cover of G. Consider the committee W = Z ∪ {yi : ui ∈ S};
note that |W | = p+ t = k. The voters in N3 and 5qt voters in N1 have their most-preferred
candidate in W , so they obtain a Borda score of 0. For the remaining (5q)(p− t) voters in N1,
their score under W is −1, since zi ∈W for all i. Further, each voter in N2 obtains a score
of at least −2. Indeed, the candidates that correspond to the endpoints of the respective
edge are ranked in positions 2 and 3 in this voter’s ranking, and since S is a vertex cover for
G, one of these candidates is in S. We conclude that m+µ (P,W ) > −(5q)(p− t)− 2q = B.
Conversely, suppose there exists a committee W of size k = p+ t with m+µ (P,W ) > B.
Note first that W has to contain all candidates in Z: otherwise, there are M voters
in N3 with utility at most −1, and then the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant score of
W is at most −M < B. Thus Z ⊆ W . We will now argue that W \ Z is a subset
of Y , and that S′ = {ui : yi ∈ W \ Z} is a vertex cover of G. Suppose that W \ Z
contains too few candidates from Y , i.e., at most t − 1 candidates from Y . Then N1
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contains at least (5q)(p− (t− 1)) voters who contribute at most −1 to the score of W , so
m+µ (P,W ) 6 −(5q)(p − t + 1) < −(5q)(p − t) − 2q = B, a contradiction. Thus, we have
W \ Z ⊆ Y . Now, suppose that S′ is not a vertex cover for G. Let ej ∈ E be an edge that
is not covered by S′, and consider the voter in N2 corresponding to ej . Clearly, none of the
candidates ranked in positions 1, . . . ,M + 3 by this voter appear in W . Thus, this voter
contributes less than −M to the score of W , so the total score of W is less than −M < B,
a contradiction. Thus, a ‘yes’-instance of Utilitarian CC corresponds to a ‘yes’-instance
of Vertex Cover.
In the appendix, we modify this reduction to establish hardness even on trees with
maximum degree 3; intuitively, it suffices to ‘clone’ candidate a. Thus, while many other
natural problems are at least easy on trees with bounded degree, this is not the case for
the winner determination problem under the utilitarian version of the Chamberlin–Courant
rule. In the appendix, we also show that for some other choices of scoring function, winner
determination in the utilitarian case remains hard even for preferences single-peaked on a
star.
5. Utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant on Trees with Few Leaves
The hardness result in Section 4 shows that single-peakedness on trees is not a strong
enough assumption to make our winner determination problem tractable. However, if we
place further constraints on the shape of the underlying tree, we may be able to achieve
tractability.
In this section, we present an algorithm for the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant rule
whose running time is polynomial on any profile that is single-peaked on a tree with a
constant number of leaves. The algorithm proceeds by dynamic programming; it can be seen
as a generalization of the algorithm due to Betzler et al. (2013) for preferences single-peaked
on a path, i.e., a tree with two leaves.
Theorem 5.1. Given a profile P with |C| = m and |N | = n a tree T with λ leaves such
that P is single-peaked on T , and a target committee size k, we can find a winning committee
under the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant rule in time poly(n,mλ, kλ).
Proof. We use dynamic programming to find a committee of size k that maximizes the
utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant score.
r∗
Figure 2: An anti-chain
We pick an arbitrary vertex r∗ to be the root of T .
This choice induces a partial order  on C: we set a  b
if a lies on the (unique) path from r∗ to b in T . Thus,
r∗  a for every a ∈ C \ {r∗}. A set A ⊆ C is said to be
an anti-chain if no two elements of A are comparable
with respect to . Figure 2 on the right provides an
example; if we added the left child of r∗ to the set, it
would no longer be an anti-chain. Observe that for every
subset of C its set of maximal elements with respect to  forms an anti-chain. Note also
that every two ancestors of a leaf are comparable with respect to , so if a and b belong to
an anti-chain A ⊆ C and c is a leaf of T , then it cannot be the case that both a and b are
ancestors of c; hence |A| 6 λ.
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Given a vertex r, let Tr be the subtree of T rooted at r. The vertex set of Tr is
Cr = {r} ∪ {c : r  c}. Let Nr = {i ∈ N : top(i) ∈ Cr} be the set of all voters whose
most-preferred candidate belongs to Cr. Let Pr be the profile obtained from P by restricting
the candidate set to Cr and the voter set to Nr. For each r ∈ C and each ` = 1, . . . , k let
M(r, `) = max
{
m+µ (Pr,W ) : W ⊆ Cr with |W | = ` and r ∈W
}
be the highest Chamberlin–Courant score obtainable in Pr by a committee from Cr of size
at most `, subject to r being selected.
Suppose that we have computed these quantities for all descendants of r; we will now
explain how to compute them for r. Let W ⊆ Cr be an optimal committee for Pr that
has size ` and includes r, so that m+µ (Pr,W ) = M(r, `). Let A = {r1, . . . , rs} be the set of
maximal elements of W \ {r} with respect to  and let `j = |W ∩ Crj | for j = 1, . . . , s; we
have `1 + · · ·+ `s = `− 1. Since Pr is single-peaked on T , for each j = 1, . . . , s it holds that
each voter in Nrj is better represented by rj than by any candidate not in Crj . Thus, the
contribution of voters in Nrj to the total score M(r, `) of W is given by m
+
µ (Prj ,W ∩ Crj ).
In fact, this quantity must equal M(rj , `j), since otherwise we could replace the candidates
in W ∩ Crj by an optimizer of M(rj , `j), thereby increasing the score of W , which would
be a contradiction. On the other hand, consider a voter i in Nr \ (Nr1 ∪ · · · ∪Nrs). Voter
i’s most-preferred candidate in W must be one of r, r1, . . . , rs: Since Pr is single-peaked on
T , for each j = 1, . . . , s it holds that candidate rj is a better representative for i than any
other candidate in Crj .
This suggests the following procedure for computing M(r, `). The case ` = 1 is straight-
forward, as the unique optimal committee in this case is {r}. For ` > 1, let Tr be the set of
all anti-chains in Tr. A t-division scheme for an anti-chain A = {r1, . . . , rs} ∈ Tr is a list
L = (`1, . . . , `s) such that `j > 1 for all j = 1, . . . , s and `1 + · · ·+ `s = t. We denote by LAt
the set of all t-division schemes for A. Now, for every anti-chain A = {r1, . . . , rs} ∈ Tr \{{r}}
and every (`− 1)-division scheme L = (`1, . . . , `s) ∈ LA`−1, we set N ′r = Nr \ (Nr1 ∪ . . .∪Nrs)
and
M(A,L) =
s∑
j=1
M(rj , `j) +
∑
i∈N ′r
µ(i, top(i, A ∪ {r})).
We then have M(r, `) = maxA∈Tr\{{r}},L∈LA`−1 M(A,L), where we maximize over all anti-
chains in Tr except {r} and over all ways of dividing the `− 1 slots among the elements of
the anti-chain. The base case for this recurrence corresponds to the case where r is a leaf,
and is easy to deal with.
The final answer depends on whether the root r∗ is part of an optimal Chamberlin–
Courant committee. If yes, then the score of an optimum Chamberlin–Courant committee is
M(r∗, k). Otherwise, we need to maximize over all antichains A = {r1, . . . , rs} ∈ Tr∗ \{{r∗}}
and over all ways of dividing the k slots L = (`1, . . . , `s) ∈ LAk . That is, we set N ′r∗ =
Nr∗ \ (Nr1 ∪ . . . ∪Nrs) and
M ′(A,L) =
s∑
j=1
M(rj , `j) +
∑
i∈N ′
r∗
µ(i, top(i, A)).
Note that r∗ does not appear in the second term. The total Chamberlin–Courant score is
given by max{M(r∗, k),maxA∈Tr∗\{{r∗}},L∈LAk M
′(A,L)}.
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We have argued that the size of each anti-chain is at most λ. Therefore, to calculate each
M(r, `), we enumerate at most mλ anti-chains and at most kλ divisions. This establishes
our bound on the running time.
Notice that the time bound in Theorem 5.1 implies that our problem is in XP with
respect to the number λ of leaves in the underlying tree. Whether there is an FPT algorithm
for this parameter, or even for the combined parameter (k, λ), remains an open problem.
6. Utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant on Trees with Few Internal Vertices
Consider the star with center candidate z and leaf candidates c1, . . . , c7. Which preference
orders are single-peaked on this tree?
c1
c2
c3
c4c5
c6
c7
z
A ranking could begin with z. After z, we can rank the other candidates in an arbitrary
order without violating single-peakedness. But suppose we begin the ranking with a leaf
candidate such as c1. Then z must be the second candidate, because the set consisting of
the top two candidates must be connected in the tree. After ranking c1 and z, we can then
order the remaining candidates arbitrarily without violating single-peakedness. Thus, the
rankings that are single-peaked on the star are precisely the rankings in which the center
vertex is ranked first or second.
Proposition 6.1. A preference profile is single-peaked on a star if and only if there exists
a candidate that every voter ranks in first or second position.
This observation implies that, in some sense, the restriction of being single-peaked on a
tree does not give us much information. For example, consider the problem of computing an
optimal Kemeny ranking, i.e., a ranking that minimizes the sum of Kendall tau distances to
the rankings in the input profile. This problem is NP-complete in general (Bartholdi et al.,
1989), and we can easily see that it remains hard for preferences single-peaked on a star.
Indeed, we can transform a general instance of this problem into one that is single-peaked
on a star by adding a new candidate that is ranked in the first position by every voter; the
resulting problem is clearly as hard as the original one.
For some other problems, though, the restriction to stars makes the problem easy. In
particular, this is the case for the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant rule with the Borda
scoring function. To see this, note that it will often be a good idea to include the candidate
who is the center vertex of the star in the committee. Once we have done so, every voter is
already quite well represented: the Borda score of each voter’s representative is either 0 or
−1. So it remains to identify k− 1 candidates whose inclusion in the committee would bring
the score of as many voters as possible up to 0, which amounts to simply selecting k − 1
candidates with highest plurality scores.3 Finally, we need to consider the case where an
3. Recall that a candidate’s plurality score is the number of voters who rank this candidate first.
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optimal committee does not include the center vertex; however, one can check that in this
case the committee necessarily consists of k candidates with highest plurality scores (see the
proof of Theorem 6.2 below). By selecting the better of the two committees produced, we
find a winning committee. This procedure works for many scoring functions other than Borda
(see the end of this section). However, as we show in the appendix, this argument does not
extend to all scoring functions: For some positional scoring functions, winner determination
for utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant remains hard even for preferences single-peaked on a
star.
The algorithm we have sketched for the Borda scoring function on stars can be generalized
to trees that have a small number of internal vertices (and thus a large number of leaves).
While for stars it suffices to guess whether the center vertex would be part of the winning
committee, we now have to make a similar guess for each internal vertex.
Theorem 6.2. Given a profile P with |C| = m and |N | = n, a tree T ∈ T (P ) with η
internal vertices such that P is single-peaked on T , and a target committee size k > 1, we
can find a winning committee of size k for P under the Chamberlin–Courant rule with the
Borda scoring function in time poly(n,m, (k + 1)η).
Proof. Given a candidate c ∈ C, let plu(c) = |{i ∈ N : top(i) = c}| be the number of voters
in P that rank c first. Let C◦ be the set of internal vertices of T . For each candidate c ∈ C◦,
let lvs(c) denote the set of leaf candidates in C \ C◦ that are adjacent to c in T .
Our algorithm proceeds as follows. For each candidate c ∈ C◦ it guesses a pair (x(c), `(c)),
where x(c) ∈ {0, 1} and 0 6 `(c) 6 |lvs(c)|. The component x(c) indicates whether c itself is
in the committee, and `(c) indicates how many candidates in lvs(c) are in the committee.
We require
∑
c∈C◦(x(c) + `(c)) = k. Next, the algorithm sets W = {c ∈ C◦ : x(c) = 1},
and then for each c ∈ C◦ it orders the candidates in lvs(c) in non-increasing order of plu(c)
(breaking ties according to a fixed ordering B over C), and adds the first `(c) candidates in
this order to W .
Each guess corresponds to a committee of size k. Guessing can be implemented de-
terministically: consider all options for the collection of pairs {(x(c), `(c))}c∈C◦ satisfying∑
c∈C◦(x(c)+`(c)) = k (there are at most 2
η ·(k+1)η possibilities), compute the Chamberlin–
Courant score of the resulting committee for each option, and output the best one.
It remains to argue that this algorithm finds a committee with the maximum Chamberlin–
Courant score. To see this, let S be the set of all size-k committees with the maximum
Chamberlin–Courant score, and pick a committee S∗ from arg maxW∈S |W ∩ C◦|. When
picking S∗, we may break ties according to B, so that there is no set S ∈ arg maxW∈S |W∩C◦|
such that S∗ \ S = {c}, S \ S∗ = {c′} and c′ B c.
For each c ∈ C◦, let x∗(c) = 1 if c ∈ S∗ and x∗(c) = 0 otherwise, and let `∗(c) =
|lvs(c) ∩ S∗|. Our algorithm will consider the collection of pairs {(x∗(c), `∗(c))}c∈C◦ at some
point, and construct a committee S based on this collection. We will now argue that S = S∗.
This would show correctness of our algorithm, since it returns a committee with a total
score at least as high as that of S.
Clearly, we have C◦ ∩ S = C◦ ∩ S∗, so it remains to argue that lvs(c) ∩ S∗ = lvs(c) ∩ S
for each c ∈ C◦. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this is not the case, i.e., there
exists a c ∈ C◦ and a pair of candidates a, b ∈ lvs(c) with a ∈ S \ S∗ and b ∈ S∗ \ S. We
distinguish two cases: c ∈ S∗ or c 6∈ S∗.
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If c ∈ S∗, consider the committee S′ = (S∗ \ {b}) ∪ {a}. We claim that S′ has the same
Chamberlin–Courant score as S∗. Note that when moving from S∗ to S′,
• the score obtained by the plu(b) voters who rank b first changes from 0 to −1,
• the score obtained by the plu(a) voters who rank a first changes from −1 to 0,
• the score of all other voters is unaffected by the change, since they prefer c ∈ S∗ ∩ S′
to both a and b.
We also have plu(a) > plu(b) by construction of S, and so the score of S′ is at least the
score of S∗, and hence plu(a) = plu(b). But then by construction of S we have aB b, and
this contradicts our choice of S∗ from arg maxW∈S |W ∩ C◦|.
Now, suppose that c 6∈ S∗. Consider the committee S′ = (S∗ \ {b}) ∪ {c}. Again, we
claim that S′ has the same Chamberlin–Courant score as S∗. Note that when moving from
S∗ to S′,
• we have decreased the score of each of the plu(b) voters who rank b first by 1 (as all of
them rank c second),
• we have increased the score of each of the plu(a) voters who rank a first by at least 1
(as all of them rank c second),
• and we do not decrease the score of any other voter (as all of them prefer c to b).
Again, we have plu(a) > plu(b) by construction of S, and so the score of S′ is at least
the score of S∗, and hence plu(a) = plu(b). Thus, the Chamberlin–Courant score of S′ is
optimal, and so S′ ∈ S. But |S′ ∩ C◦| > |S∗ ∩ C◦|, which contradicts our choice of S∗ from
arg maxW∈S |W ∩ C◦|.
It is clear from our proof that Theorem 6.2 holds for every positional scoring function
whose score vector satisfies s1 = 0, s2 = −1, s3 6 −2. Observe also that our algorithm is
in FPT with respect to the combined parameter (k, η); in contrast, for general preferences
computing the Chamberlin–Courant winners is W[2]-hard with respect to k even under the
Borda scoring function (Betzler et al., 2013).
7. Structure of the Set of Trees a Profile is Single-Peaked on: The
Attachment Digraph
We now move on from our study of multiwinner elections and turn towards the problem
of recognizing when a given preference profile is single-peaked on a tree. In particular, for
each profile P , we will study the collection T (P ) of all trees on which P is single-peaked.
It turns out that the set T (P ) has interesting structural properties, and admits a concise
representation. In many cases, this will allow us to pick a ‘nice’ tree from T (P ) i.e., a
tree that satisfies certain additional requirements. For example, to use the algorithm from
Section 5, we would want to pick a tree from T (P ) with the smallest number of leaves, and
to use the algorithm from Section 6, we would want to use a tree with the smallest number
of internal vertices.
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Trick (1989b) presents an algorithm that decides whether T (P ) is non-empty. If so, the
algorithm produces some tree T with T ∈ T (P ). While building the tree, the algorithm
makes various arbitrary choices. In our approach, we will store all the choices that the
algorithm could take; we introduce a data structure which we call the attachment digraph of
profile P which encapsulates all the choices recorded.
We will start by giving a high-level description of Trick’s algorithm; the discussion follows
Trick’s paper closely. We first take inspiration from algorithms for recognizing preferences
that are single-peaked on a line. They typically start out by noticing that an alternative
that is ranked bottom-most by some voter must be placed at one of the ends of the axis.
Trick’s algorithm uses the same idea; the analogue for trees is as follows.
Proposition 7.1. Suppose P is single-peaked on T , and suppose c occurs as a bottom-most
alternative, that is, bottom(i) = c for some i ∈ N . Then c is a leaf of T .
Proof. The set A \ {c} is a top-initial segment of the i-th vote, and hence must be connected
in T . This can only be the case if c is a leaf of T .
Suppose we have identified a bottom-ranked alternative c; we deduce that if our profile
is single-peaked on any tree T , then c is a leaf of T . Now, being a leaf, c must have exactly
one neighboring vertex b. Which vertex could this be? The following simple observation
gives some necessary conditions.
Proposition 7.2. Suppose P is single-peaked on T , and suppose c ∈ C is a leaf of T ,
adjacent to b ∈ C. Let i ∈ N be a voter. Then either
(i) b i c, or
(ii) c = top(i) and b = second(i).
Proof. (i) Suppose first that c is not i’s top-ranked alternative, and rather top(i) = a. Take
the unique path in T from a to c, which passes through b since b is the only neighbor of c.
Since i’s vote is single-peaked on T , it is single-peaked on this path, and hence i’s preference
decreases along it from a to c. Since b is visited before c, it follows that b i c.
(ii) Suppose, otherwise, that c is i’s top-ranked alternative. Then {c, second(i)} is a
top-initial segment of i’s vote, which by Proposition 2.2 is a connected set in T , and hence
forms an edge. Thus, c is adjacent to second(i), so second(i) = b as required.
Thus, in our search for a neighbor of the leaf c, we can restrict our attention to those
alternatives b that satisfy either (i) or (ii) in the proposition above, for every voter i ∈ N .
Let us write this down more formally: For each c ∈ C and i ∈ N , define
B(i, c) =
{
{a ∈ C : a i c} if top(i) 6= c,
{second(i)} if top(i) = c.
Applying Proposition 7.2 to all voters i gives us the following constraint for our choice of b.
Corollary 7.3. Suppose a profile is single-peaked on T , and c ∈ C is a leaf of T . Then c
must be adjacent to an element of B(c) :=
⋂
i∈N B(i, c).
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We have established that it is necessary for leaf c to be adjacent to some alternative in
B(c). It turns out that if the profile is single-peaked on a tree, then for every alternative
b ∈ B(c) there is some tree T ∈ T (P ) in which c is adjacent to b.
Proposition 7.4. Let P be a profile in which c occurs bottom-ranked. Suppose that P |C\{c}
is single-peaked on some tree T−c, and let T be a tree obtained from T−c by attaching c as a
leaf adjacent to some element b ∈ B(c). Then P is single-peaked on T .
Proof. Let T be a tree obtained as described. We show that P is single-peaked on T . Let
S ⊆ C be a top-initial segment of the ranking of some voter i in P . We need to show that S
is connected in T .
• If c 6∈ S, then S is connected in T−c because P |C\{c} is single-peaked on T−c. Hence S
is also connected in T .
• If S = {c}, then S is trivially connected in T .
• If c ∈ S and S 6= {c}, then S \ {c} is connected in T−c because P |C\{c} is single-peaked
on T−c. Therefore, to show that S is connected in T , it suffices to show that c’s
neighbor b is also an element of S. Since b ∈ B(c) = ⋂i∈N B(i, c), we have that
b ∈ B(i, c). If top(i) = c, then B(i, c) = {second(i)}, so b = second(i). As S is a
top-initial segment of i with |S| > 2, we have b ∈ S, as desired. Otherwise top(i) 6= c,
and so B(i, c) = {a : a i c}, hence b i c. As S is a top-initial segment of i including
c, we must have b ∈ S, as desired.
Algorithm 1 Trick’s algorithm to decide whether a profile is single-peaked on a tree
T ← (C,∅), the empty graph on C
C1 ← C, r ← 1
while |Cr| > 3 do
Lr ← {bottom(i, Cr) : i ∈ N}
for each candidate c ∈ Lr do
B(c)← ⋂i∈N B(i, Cr, c)
if B(c) = ∅ then
return fail : P is not single-peaked on any tree
else
select b ∈ B(c) arbitrarily
add an edge between c and b in T
Ci+1 ← Cr \ Lr
r ← r + 1
if |Cr| = 2 then
add an edge between the two candidates in Cr to T
return P is single-peaked on T
With these results in place, we can now see how a recognition algorithm could work.
Select an alternative c that is ranked bottom-most by some voter, select an arbitrary
candidate b ∈ B(c), add an edge {b, c} to the tree under construction, remove c from the
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profile, and recurse on the remaining candidates. If at any point we find that B(c) = ∅,
then we can conclude from Corollary 7.3 that the profile is not single-peaked on any tree.
Algorithm 1 formalizes this procedure. To avoid recursion, the algorithm uses the following
notation: for every subset S ⊂ C, for each c ∈ S, and each i ∈ N , define
B(i, S, c) =
{
{a ∈ S : a i c} if top(i, S) 6= c,
{second(i, S)} if top(i, S) = c.
Theorem 7.5. Algorithm 1 correctly decides whether a profile is single-peaked on a tree.
Proof. First, note that if Algorithm 1 succeeds and returns a graph T , then T is a tree.
Indeed, it is easy to see that T has |C| − 1 edges. Moreover, T is connected, because every
vertex has a path to a vertex in the set Cr at the end of the algorithm.
We show that the algorithm is correct by induction on |C|. If |C| = 1 or |C| = 2, every
profile is single-peaked on the unique tree on C, and Algorithm 1 correctly determines
this. If |C| > 3, then the while loop is executed at least once. If in the first iteration the
algorithm claims that the profile is not single-peaked on a tree because B(c) = ∅ for some
c ∈ L1, then this statement is correct by Corollary 7.3. Otherwise, after the first iteration
the algorithm behaves as if it was run on P |C2 (recall that C2 = C \ L1).
Now, if the algorithm fails in later iterations, by the inductive hypothesis, P |C2 is not
single-peaked on a tree. But then P is not single-peaked on a tree either: Suppose it was
single-peaked on T . Then, by Proposition 7.1, all candidates in L1 are leaves of T , and
therefore T |C2 is still a tree, and so P |C2 is single-peaked on T |C2 (by Proposition 2.2), a
contradiction. Thus, in this case, the algorithm run on P correctly determines that P is not
single-peaked on a tree.
On the other hand, if the algorithm run on P terminates and returns a tree T , then its
run on P |C2 would have terminated and returned the tree T |C2 . By the inductive hypothesis,
P |C2 is single-peaked on T |C2 . Hence, by Proposition 7.4, P is single-peaked on T , and so
the algorithm is correct.
Trick’s algorithm makes some arbitrary choices when selecting alternatives b ∈ B(c).
Our aim is to understand the set T (P ) of all trees that the input profile P is single-peaked
on, so a natural approach is to record all possible choices that Trick’s algorithm could
make at each step, as this will encode all possible outputs of the algorithm. We do this by
running Algorithm 2, which has the same structure as Algorithm 1. Given a profile that is
single-peaked on some tree, it constructs and returns a digraph D with vertex set C which
contains all possible choices that Trick’s algorithm can make. We call D the attachment
digraph of the input profile.
Example 7.6. The attachment digraphs of the following three profiles are shown in Figure 3.
(a) Suppose C = {a, b, c, d, e}, and let P1 be the profile with voters N = {1, 2} such that
a 1 b 1 c 1 d 1 e and e 2 d 2 c 2 b 2 a, so that the two votes are the reverse of
each other. Running Algorithm 2, we consider the sets L1 = {a, e} and L2 = {b, d}.
(b) Suppose C = {a, b, c, d, e}, and let P2 be the profile with voters N = {1, 2} such that
a 1 b 1 c 1 d 1 e and e 2 b 2 c 2 d 2 a. Running Algorithm 2, we consider the
sets L1 = {a, e} and L2 = {d}.
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Algorithm 2 Build attachment digraph D = (C,A) of P
D ← (C,A), A← ∅, so D is the empty digraph on C
C1 ← C, r ← 1
while |Cr| > 3 do
Lr ← {bottom(i, Cr) : i ∈ N}
for each candidate c ∈ Lr do
B(c)← ⋂i∈N B(i, Cr, c)
if B(c) = ∅ then
return fail : P is not single-peaked on any tree
else
for each b ∈ B(c), add an arc (c, b) to A
Ci+1 ← Cr \ Lr
r ← r + 1
if |Cr| = 2 then
add an arc between the two candidates in Cr to A, arbitrarily directed
return D
a b c d e
(a)
a b c
de
(b)
c d
b
a
e f g
h
i
j
k
(c)
Figure 3: The attachment digraphs of the profiles in Example 7.6. If a vertex has a unique
outgoing arc, the arc is drawn in black. If the vertex has at least two outgoing arcs, the arcs
are drawn in gray and curved.
(c) Suppose C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k}, and let P3 be the profile with voters N =
{1, 2, 3} such that k 1 f 1 e 1 d 1 g 1 h 1 c 1 i 1 j 1 b 1 a, d 2 c 2 b 2
e 2 a 2 f 2 g 2 h 2 i 2 j 2 k, and g 3 f 3 h 3 i 3 e 3 d 3 c 3 b 3 a 3
j 3 k. Running Algorithm 2, we consider the sets L1 = {a, k}, L2 = {b, j}, L3 = {c, i},
L4 = {d, h}, and L5 = {e, g}.
Algorithm 2 runs in time O(|N | · |C|2). In the rest of this section, we will analyze the
structure of the attachment digraph, and its relation to the set T (P ) of trees on which P is
single-peaked. We start with a few simple properties.
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Proposition 7.7. Let x ∈ C be a candidate with x ∈ Lr. Then B(x) ∩ Lr = ∅. Hence, for
every arc (x, y) ∈ A with x ∈ Lr and y ∈ Ls, we have that s > r.
Proof. Note that the set Lr is only well-defined when |Cr| > 3. Assume for a contradiction
that y ∈ B(x) and y ∈ Lr. Since y ∈ Lr, there is some voter i ∈ N such that y =
bottom(i, Cr). But then y 6i x and y 6= second(i, Cr) (as |Cr| > 3), so it cannot be the case
that y ∈ B(i, Cr, x), a contradiction.
For the second statement, note that if (x, y) ∈ A is an arc, then y ∈ B(x). Since
B(x) ⊆ Cr = C \ (L1 ∪ . . . ∪ Lr−1), we must have s > r. By the previous paragraph, s = r
is impossible, and hence s > r.
Proposition 7.8. Every attachment digraph D = (C,A) is acyclic and has exactly one
sink.
Proof. Suppose that the while loop of Algorithm 2 is executed R− 1 times, and consider
the sets L1, . . . , LR−1. Set LR := C \ (L1 ∪ . . .∪LR−1). Then L1, . . . , LR is a partition of C.
For acyclicity, note that for each c ∈ Lr with 1 6 r < R we have B(i, Cr, c) ⊆ Cr and
hence B(c) ⊆ Cr. Together with Proposition 7.7, this implies that if c ∈ Lr then all outgoing
arcs of c point into Li+1 ∪ . . . ∪ LR. Hence, in the partition L1, . . . , LR, all arcs point to the
right, and thus there cannot be a cycle in D.
For the number of sinks, note that there is at least one sink in D because D is acyclic.
Since for every c ∈ C \ LR we have B(c) 6= ∅, at least one outgoing arc of c is added to D.
Thus, no vertex in C \ LR is a sink. The condition of the while loop implies that |LR| 6 2.
If |LR| = 1, then there is exactly one sink, and we are done. If |LR| = 2, then the final if
clause of the algorithm adds an arc between the two vertices in LR, which ensures that only
one of them is a sink.
If we wish to extract a tree T ∈ T (P ) from the attachment digraph D, Trick’s algorithm
tells us that we must choose, for each non-sink vertex of D, exactly one outgoing arc, and
add this arc as an edge. To formalize this process, we denote the sink vertex by t, and say
that a function f : C \ {t} → C is an attachment function for D if (c, f(c)) ∈ A is an arc of
D for every c ∈ C \ {t}. Thus, f specifies one outgoing arc for each c ∈ C \ {c}. Given an
attachment function f , we write T (f) for the tree on C with edge set
{{c, f(c)} : c ∈ C \ {t}}.
We now prove that every attachment function corresponds to a tree, and all trees in T (P )
can be obtained in this way.
Theorem 7.9. Let P be a profile that is single-peaked on some tree, and let D be its
attachment digraph. Then T ∈ T (P ) if and only if T = T (f) for some attachment function f .
In other words, P is single-peaked on a tree T if and only if T ’s edge set consists of exactly
one outgoing arc of each non-sink vertex of D.
Proof. Suppose T = T (f) for some attachment function f . Then T is a possible output
of Algorithm 1, for a suitable way of making the selections from B(c) for each vertex c
processed in the while loop. Thus, by Theorem 7.5, the profile P is single-peaked on T .
21
Peters, Yu, Chan, & Elkind
b
a
c d
e
a b c d
e
Figure 4: The set T (P2) of trees on which the profile P2 from Example 7.6 is single-peaked
consists of these two trees. For the tree on the left, the attachment function has f(d) = b,
while for the tree on the right, it has f(d) = c.
We prove the converse by induction on |C|. If |C| 6 2, then P is single-peaked on the
unique tree on C, which can be obtained as T (f) for the unique attachment function f .
So suppose that |C| > 3, and that T = (C,E) is a tree such that P is single-peaked on T .
During the first iteration of Algorithm 2, the algorithm determines the set L1 of candidates
occurring in bottom position, and sets C2 = C \L1. By Proposition 7.1, each vertex in L1 is
a leaf of T . Hence, the induced subgraph T |C2 is also a tree, and thus P |C2 is single-peaked
on T |C2 . Also, by inspection of Algorithm 2, the attachment digraph of P |C2 is D|C2 . By the
inductive hypothesis, T |C2 = T (f ′) for some attachment function f ′ defined for D|C2 . Thus,
we can define an attachment function f so that for each c ∈ C2 \ {t} we set f(c) = f ′(c),
and for each c ∈ L1 we set f(c) to be the unique neighbor of c in T . By Corollary 7.3, T is
obtained from T |C2 by attaching each c ∈ L1 to an element of B(c), which implies that f is
a legal attachment function. Thus, T = T (f), which proves the claim.
Using this characterization of the set T (P ) and noting that T (f1) 6= T (f2) whenever
f1 6= f2, we can conclude that the number of trees in T (P ) is equal to the number of different
attachment functions. This observation can be restated as follows.
Corollary 7.10. The number of trees in T (P ) is equal to the product of the out-degrees of
the non-sink vertices of D. Hence we can compute |T (P )| in polynomial time.
For the profiles in Example 7.6, we see that P1 is single-peaked on a unique tree (a path),
that P2 is single-peaked on exactly 2 trees (shown in Figure 4), and that P3 is single-peaked
on exactly 336 different trees.
It turns out that attachment digraphs have a lot of structure beyond the results of
Proposition 7.8. A key property, which will allow us to use essentially greedy algorithms, is
what we call circumtransitivity.
Definition 7.11. A directed acyclic graph D = (C,A) is circumtransitive if its vertices can
be partitioned into a set →C of forced vertices and a set ⇒C = C \ →C of free vertices such
that
1. every forced vertex c ∈ →C has out-degree at most 1, and if (c, c′) ∈ A then also c′ ∈ →C ,
and
2. every free vertex c ∈ ⇒C has out-degree at least 2, and whenever x, y ∈ ⇒C and z ∈ C
are such that (x, y), (y, z) ∈ A, then (x, z) ∈ A.
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Recall that every directed acyclic graph D has at least one sink. If D is also circumtransitive,
then its sinks must be among the forced vertices.
A circumtransitive digraph consists of an inner part (the forced part), and an outer part,
which is transitively attached to the inner part.
Theorem 7.12. Every attachment digraph (C,A) is circumtransitive.
Proof. We will argue that Definition 7.11 is satisfied by taking the partition
→C = {c : d+(c) 6 1}, ⇒C = {c : d+(c) > 2}.
Forced: Let x ∈ →C . If d+(x) = 0, there is nothing to prove, so assume that d+(x) = 1, i.e.,
(x, y) ∈ A for some y ∈ C. We will show that d+(y) ∈ {0, 1} and hence that y ∈ →C .
If y is a sink, we are done. Otherwise, there exists an arc (y, z) ∈ A for some z ∈ C.
Suppose that x ∈ Lr and y ∈ Ls for some 1 6 r < s 6 f − 1. (Such r, s exist because neither
x nor y are sinks. We have r < s because (x, y) ∈ A, see Proposition 7.7.) Because y is the
only out-neighbor of x, we have that (x, z) 6∈ A and so z 6∈ B(x) = ⋂i∈N B(i, Cr, x). Note
that y ∈ Cr and hence z ∈ Cr as well. Since z 6∈ B(x), we have z 6∈ B(i, Cr, x) for some
i ∈ N . On the other hand, since (x, y) ∈ A, we have y ∈ B(x) and thus y ∈ B(i, Cr, x) We
consider two cases:
(i) x 6= top(i, Cr). Then B(i, Cr, x) = {c ∈ Cr : c i x}, and thus y i x i z. Now
consider iteration s. If y = top(i, Cs), then |B(i, Cs, y)| = 1 so |B(y)| = 1. Hence,
y has exactly one out-neighbor, as desired. Otherwise, since (y, z) ∈ A, we have
z ∈ B(i, Cs, y) and so z i y. But then by transitivity z i x, contradicting that
z 6∈ B(i, Cr, x).
(ii) x = top(i, Cr). Then B(i, Cr, x) = {second(i, Cr)}, and thus since y ∈ B(i, Cr, x) we
see that y = second(i, Cr). Note that x 6∈ Cs but y ∈ Cs. Therefore, top(i, Cs) = y,
and thus |B(i, Cj , y)| = 1 so |B(y)| = 1. Hence y has exactly one out-neighbor, as
desired.
Free: Consider vertices x, y, z ∈ C with x, y ∈ ⇒C and (x, y), (y, z) ∈ A. Since x, y ∈ ⇒C ,
they are not sinks, so x, y 6∈ Lf . Take r < s such that x ∈ Lr and y ∈ Ls. Note that if
there was a voter i ∈ N with top(i, Cr) = x, then |B(x)| = 1, contradicting that d+(x) > 1.
Thus top(i, Cr) 6= x for all i ∈ N . Because (x, y) ∈ A, for all i ∈ N we have y ∈ B(i, Cr, x)
and hence y i x. Similarly, since (y, z) ∈ A and d+(y) > 1 we have z i y for all i ∈ N .
Hence, by transitivity, z i x for all i ∈ N . Therefore z ∈
⋂
i∈N B(i, Cr, x) = B(x) and so
(x, z) ∈ A, as desired.
Suppose that f is an attachment function for D. Then for each forced vertex c ∈ →C \{t},
the value of f(c) is uniquely determined, since c has exactly one out-neighbor. Note also
that D| →C is connected because we can reach the sink t from every forced vertex; hence,
G(D| →C ) is a tree. It follows that for every T ∈ T (P ), the tree G(D| →C ) is a subtree of T .
We will now study the free vertices ⇒C more closely. Part (d) of the following proposition
will be particularly useful; it states that for every free vertex x we can identify a pair of
forced vertices that are adjacent in D such that x can be attached to either of these vertices.
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Proposition 7.13. Suppose |C| > 3. For every free vertex x ∈ ⇒C of the attachment digraph
D = (C,A),
(a) there is a forced vertex y ∈ →C with (x, y) ∈ A;
(b) there are at least two forced vertices y, z ∈ →C with (x, y), (x, z) ∈ A;
(c) the set {y ∈ →C : (x, y) ∈ A} induces a subtree in G(D);
(d) there are two forced vertices y, z ∈ →C with (x, y), (x, z), (y, z) ∈ A.
Proof. (a) The directed acyclic graph D has a unique sink t, and there must be a directed
path x = c1 → c2 → · · · → cp = t from x to t; take such a path of minimum length. If p = 2,
then (x, t) ∈ A, and so we are done since t ∈ →C . So suppose that p > 3. Assume first that c2
is a free vertex. Then c1, c2 ∈ ⇒C , and (c1, c2), (c2, c3) ∈ A, and since D is circumtransitive,
we have (c1, c3) ∈ A. Thus, c1 → c3 → · · · → cp is a shorter path, contradiction. Hence
c2 ∈ →C , and we have proved that x is adjacent to at least one forced vertex.
(b) Suppose the statement is false. Choose r maximum such that there is a free vertex
x ∈ ⇒C with x ∈ Lr such that there is a unique forced vertex y ∈ →C with (x, y) ∈ A.
Because x ∈ ⇒C , we have d+(x) > 2, and so there must be w ∈ ⇒C with (x,w) ∈ A. Because
(x,w) ∈ A, we have w ∈ Ls for some s > r. Since w is a free vertex, by (a), there must
be a forced vertex y′ ∈ →C with (w, y′) ∈ A. By circumtransitivity, since (x,w) ∈ A and
(w, y′) ∈ A, we have that (x, y′) ∈ A, and thus y = y′. Thus we have (w, y) ∈ A. Hence, w
has a unique forced out-neighbor, which contradicts maximality of r.
(c) Suppose x ∈ Lr, and suppose that A contains arcs (x, y) and (x, z) where y, z ∈ →C .
Since G(D| →C ) is a tree, there is a unique path Q from y to z in G(D| →C ); let CQ ⊆ →C
be the vertex set of the path Q. Fix any tree T ∈ T (P ). Then G(D| →C ) is a subgraph
of T , and so Q is a path in T . Pick a vote i ∈ N . Since y, z ∈ B(x), we have |B(x)| > 1
and so |B(i, Cr, x)| > 1, and thus we have y i x, z i x. Consider the top-initial segment
W = {c ∈ C : c i x}. By Proposition 2.2, since P is single-peaked on T , the set W is
connected in T . Since y, z ∈W , the path Q must be contained in T |W , and hence CQ ⊆W .
Thus, w i x for each w ∈ CQ, and so CQ ⊆ B(i, Cr, x). As this holds for every i ∈ N ,
CQ ⊆ B(x), and so CQ ⊆ {y ∈ →C : (x, y) ∈ A}. Hence, {y ∈ →C : (x, y) ∈ A} is connected
in G(D| →C ).
(d) The set {y ∈ →C : (x, y) ∈ A} is connected (by (c)) and contains at least two members
(by (b)). Hence, by definition of G, it contains some vertices y and z with (y, z) ∈ A.
In the next section, we will use the properties of attachment digraphs established in this
section to develop algorithms that can check whether a given profile is single-peaked on a
tree that satisfies certain constraints.
8. Recognition Algorithms: Finding Nice Trees
Suppose we are given a profile P with T (P ) 6= ∅ and wish to find trees in T (P ) that satisfy
additional desiderata. We will now show how the attachment digraph can be used to achieve
this. We assume throughout this section that |C| > 3, since otherwise there is a unique tree
T on C, and the problem of selecting the best tree is trivial.
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8.1 Minimum Number of Internal Vertices
In Section 6, we saw an algorithm that could solve Utilitarian CC efficiently for profiles
single-peaked on a tree T with few internal vertices, where T was taken as input to the
algorithm. We now show how we can find, given a profile, the tree T ∈ T (P ) that has the
fewest internal vertices. Algorithm 3 constructs an attachment function, and tries to make
every vertex a leaf, if possible. In particular, every free vertex in the attachment digraph
will become a leaf. We begin by showing that the description of Algorithm 3 is well-defined,
in the sense that existence statement in the algorithm are correct.
Algorithm 3 Find T ∈ T (P ) with fewest internal vertices
Let D = (C,A) be the attachment digraph of P
Let →C , ⇒C be the collection of forced and free vertices in D
Let t be the sink vertex of D
f ← ∅, an attachment function under construction
for each c ∈ →C \ {t} do
f(c)← c′ where c′ is the unique c′ ∈ C with (c, c′) ∈ A
if | →C | = 2 then
pick some y ∈ →C
for each c ∈ ⇒C do
f(c)← y
else if | →C | > 2 then
for each c ∈ ⇒C do
find y ∈ →C such that (c, y) ∈ A and y is internal in G(D| →C )
f(c)← y
return T ∗ = T (f)
Proposition 8.1. Algorithm 3 returns a tree T ∗ ∈ T (P ).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 7.9 once we can show that the choices of the algorithm
are possible. With our running assumption that |C| > 3, it follows that | →C | > 2 from
Proposition 7.13.
Suppose that | →C | > 2. By Proposition 7.13, each free vertex c ∈ ⇒C has outgoing arcs
to two forced vertices which are adjacent in G(D| →C ). Not both of them can be leaves in
the tree G(D| →C ) since | →C | > 2, so there is y ∈ →C with (c, y) ∈ A such that y is internal
in G(D| →C ). Thus, the algorithm is well-defined in this case.
Suppose that | →C | = 2. By Proposition 7.13, each c ∈ ⇒C is adjacent to both vertices in
→C , and thus (c, y) ∈ A for the choice of y ∈ →C made by the algorithm; thus T ∗ ∈ T (P ).
Next, we show that Algorithm 3 returns an optimal tree.
Proposition 8.2. Algorithm 3 returns a tree T ∗ ∈ T (P ) with the minimum number of
internal vertices among trees in T (P ) in polynomial time.
Proof. For every tree T ∈ T (P ), we must have that G(D| →C ) ⊆ T , by Theorem 7.9 and the
definition of →C . Thus, if c ∈ →C is not a leaf in the tree G(D| →C ), then c cannot be a leaf
in T .
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Suppose that | →C | > 2. Note that every free vertex c ∈ ⇒C is a leaf in T ∗ because
f(c) ∈ →C for all c ∈ C \ {t}. Further, every leaf of G(D| →C ) is also a leaf in T ∗. By our
initial observation, none of the remaining vertices can be a leaf in any T ∈ T (P ), so T ∗ has
the maximum number of leaves, and hence a minimum number of internal vertices.
Suppose that | →C | = 2. Since |C| > 3, we have ⇒C 6= ∅. Since the two members of →C
are adjacent in any T ∈ T (P ), it can’t be that both of them are leaves in T . Hence the
number of leaves in T ∈ T (P ) is at most | ⇒C |+ 1. The tree T ∗ has exactly | ⇒C |+ 1 leaves,
and hence is optimal.
8.2 Minimum Diameter
It turns out that the tree found by Algorithm 3 is also optimal on another metric: it
minimizes the diameter.
Proposition 8.3. Algorithm 3 returns a tree T ∗ ∈ T (P ) with minimum diameter among
trees in T (P ) in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that | →C | = 2. Then T ∗ is a star with center y; no tree on at least three
vertices has smaller diameter than a star.
Suppose that | →C | > 2. In this case the diameter of T ∗ is equal to the diameter of
G(D| →C ). To see this, consider a longest path (c1, . . . , ck) in T ∗. If k = 2, then T ∗ is a star,
which is a minimum-degree tree when there are |C| > 3 vertices. So suppose that k > 3.
On the longest path, only c1 and ck can be free vertices, since all free vertices are leaves in
T ∗. Suppose c1 ∈ ⇒C . Then by construction of T ∗, c2 ∈ →C , and c2 is an internal vertex of
G(D| →C ). Hence, c2 has at least two neighbors in →C . Thus, we can find a neighbor c′1 of c2
such that c′1 6= c3. Then we can replace c1 by c′1 in the longest path (noting that c′1 cannot
appear elsewhere on the path because G(D| →C ) is a tree). Similarly we can replace ck by a
forced neighbors of ck−1 if ck ∈ ⇒C . Having replaced all free vertices on the path by forced
vertices, we have obtained a longest path in T ∗ which is completely contained in G(D| →C ).
Hence, the diameter of T ∗ is equal to the diameter of G(D| →C ).
Because G(D| →C ) ⊆ T for every T ∈ T (P ), the diameter of any T ∈ T (P ) must be at
least the diameter of G(D| →C ). Hence T ∗ has minimum diameter.
8.3 Minimum Number of Leaves
In Section 5, we saw an algorithm for Utilitarian CC which is efficient when the input
profile is single-peaked on a tree with few leaves. The algorithm assumed that the tree T is
given in its input. Here, given a profile P , we show how to find the tree T ∗ ∈ T (P ) with the
fewest leaves.
Minimizing the number of leaves of a tree is equivalent to maximizing its number of
internal vertices. For this, we first characterize the set of internal vertices of a tree T (f).
Proposition 8.4. Let f be an attachment function for the attachment digraph D. Then
c ∈ C \ {t} is an internal vertex of the tree T (f) if and only if |f−1(c)| > 1, i.e., c is in the
range of f . The sink vertex t is an internal vertex of T (f) if and only if |f−1(t)| > 2, i.e.,
there are two distinct d1, d2 ∈ C with f(d1) = f(d2) = c.
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Algorithm 4 Find T ∈ T (P ) with fewest leaves
Let D = (C,A) be the attachment digraph of P
f ← ∅, an attachment function under construction
Let t be the sink vertex of D, and let s ∈ →C be a forced vertex with unique outgoing arc
(s, t) ∈ A (this exists by Proposition 7.13)
f(s)← t
Construct a bipartite graph H with vertex set L ∪R where A = {`c : c ∈ C \ {s, t}} and
B = {rc : c ∈ C} and edge set EH = {{`c, rd} : (c, d) ∈ A}.
Find a maximum matching M ⊆ EH in H
for each c ∈ C \ {t} do
if `c is matched in M , i.e. {`c, rd} ∈M for some d ∈ C then
f(c)← d
else
take any d ∈ C with (c, d) ∈ A
f(c)← d
return T ∗ = T (f)
Proof. A vertex is internal in a tree if and only if it has degree at least two. From the
definition of T (f), for c ∈ C \ {t}, the degree of c is 1 + |f−1(c)|, and the degree of t is
|f−1(t)|. The claim follows immediately.
Using this observation, we can prove that Algorithm 4 returns an optimal tree. The
algorithm is based on constructing a maximum matching.
Proposition 8.5. Algorithm 4 returns a tree T ∗ ∈ T (P ) with the minimum number of
leaves among trees in T (P ) in polynomial time.
Proof. That the output T ∗ of the algorithm is a member of T (P ) is clear from Theorem 7.9,
since the algorithm constructs an attachment function.
To see optimality, note first that minimizing the number of leaves is equivalent to
maximizing the number of internal vertices. Thus, by Proposition 8.4, we need to find an
attachment function f maximizing the number of vertices c with |f−1(c)| > 1 if c 6= t or
|f−1(c)| > 2 if c = t.
We claim that under the attachment function f constructed by Algorithm 4, a vertex
d ∈ C is an internal vertex of T (f) if and only if rd is matched in the maximum matching
M . We start with the if direction.
• Suppose d = t. If rt is matched in M to `c, then both c ∈ f−1(t) and s ∈ f−1(t),
where s is the vertex chosen at the very start of the algorithm. By definition of the
bipartite graph H, c 6= s, and so |f−1(t)| > 2, and hence t is an internal vertex by
Proposition 8.4.
• Suppose d 6= t. If rd is matched in M to `c, then c ∈ f−1(d), and so d is internal by
Proposition 8.4.
For the only if direction, suppose that d ∈ C is not matched in M . Then in the for loop
of Algorithm 4, we never set f(c) ← d for any c ∈ C \ {c}, because otherwise we could
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Figure 5: Flow network H constructed by Algorithm 5.
add the edge {`c, rd} to the matching M , contradicting its maximality. Hence, if d = t is
not matched, then f−1(t) = {s}, and so t is not internal. If d 6= t is not matched, then
f−1(d) = ∅, so d is not internal. It follows that the number of internal vertices of T (f) is
|M |, and our claim is proved.
Now suppose that T (f) is not optimal, and that T ′ ∈ T (P ) is a tree with q > |M |
internal vertices. By Theorem 7.9, since T ′ ∈ T (P ), we have T ′ = T (g) for some attachment
function g. But then we can construct a matching M ′ in H of size |M ′| = q, as follows:
• If t is an internal vertex in T ′, then by Proposition 8.4, we have |g−1(t)| > 2. Select
some c ∈ g−1(t) with c 6= s, and add {`c, rd} to M ′. If t is not internal in T ′, do
nothing.
• For each d ∈ C \ {c} which is an internal vertex of T ′, select some c ∈ g−1(d) (which
exists by Proposition 8.4), and add {`c, rd} to M ′.
Clearly, we have added q edges to M ′. Because g is a function, M ′ is a matching. Since
|M ′| > |M |, we have a contradiction to maximality of M .
8.4 Minimum Max-Degree
In some situations, it may be desirable to find a tree in which each vertex is connected
to only a few other vertices. The following algorithm can be used to do so; it is based on
calculating a maximum flow network, an example of which is shown in Figure 5.
Proposition 8.6. Algorithm 5 returns a tree T ∗ ∈ T (P ) with maximum degree at most k
if one exists, in polynomial time.
Proof. Let f be some attachment function. By definition of T (f), for each c ∈ C \ {t}, the
degree of c in T (f) is 1 + |f−1(c)|, because there is 1 edge in T (f) corresponding to an
outgoing arc of c in D, and |f−1(c)| edges in T (f) corresponding to incoming arcs to c in D.
Also, the degree of the sink vertex t in T (f) is |f−1(t)|. Thus, our task reduces to deciding
whether there exists an attachment function f with
1 + |f−1(c)| 6 k (i.e., |f−1(c)| 6 k) for each c ∈ C \ {t} and |f−1(t)| 6 k. (1)
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Algorithm 5 Decide whether there is T ∈ T (P ) with maximum degree at most k
Let D = (C,A) be the attachment digraph of P
Let t be the sink vertex of D
Let L = {`c : c ∈ C \ {t}} and B = {rc : c ∈ C} and construct a flow network H on vertex
set {a, z} ∪ L ∪R with arc set
EH = {(a, `c) : c ∈ C \ {t}} ∪ {(`c, rd) : c, d ∈ C, (c, d) ∈ A} ∪ {(rc, t) : c ∈ C},
and capacities cap(a, `c) = 1 for all c ∈ C \ {t}, cap(`c, rd) = 1 for all (c, d) ∈ A,
cap(rc, t) = k − 1 for all c ∈ C \ {t}, and cap(rt, z) = k.
Find a maximum flow in H
f ← ∅, an attachment function under construction
if the flow transports |C \ {t}| units of flow then
For each (c, d) ∈ A such that a unit of flow flows across (`c, rd), set f(c)← d
return T ∗ = T (f)
else
return there is no T ∗ ∈ T (P ) with maximum degree at most k
Such attachment functions are in one-to-one correspondence with (integral) flows of
size |C \ {t}| in the flow network constructed by Algorithm 5: Suppose f is an attachment
function satisfying equation (1); then send one unit of flow from the super-source a along
each of its |C \ {t}| outgoing links. For each c ∈ C \ {t}, send the incoming flow into `c
towards rf(c). Finally, for each c ∈ C, send the incoming flow into rc towards the super-sink
z; this satisfies the capacity constraints because f satisfies equation (1). Conversely, for any
flow of size |C \ {t}|, we can define f by setting f(c) to correspond to the destination of the
out-flow from `c. The resulting f satisfies equation (1) due to the capacity constraints of
the links between the rc and the super-sink z.
8.5 Minimum Pathwidth
Here, we show how to find a tree T ∈ T (P ) of minimum pathwidth. Our algorithm is based
on an algorithm by Scheffler (1990), which computes a minimum-width path decomposition
of a given tree in linear time.
We need a preliminary result showing that a tree always admits a minimum-width
path decomposition with a certain property: most vertices appear in a bag of the path
decomposition which has some ‘slack’, in the sense that the bag does not have maximum
cardinality.
Lemma 8.7. For every tree T = (C,E), there exists a path decomposition S1, . . . , Sr of T
of minimum width w such that, for every edge e ∈ E, there is c ∈ e for which there exists a
bag Si with c ∈ Si such that |Si| 6 w (note that maxi |Si| = w + 1).
Proof. We show how to transform any path decomposition of T into a path decomposition
of the same width having the desired property.
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Suppose S1, . . . , Sr is a path decomposition of T with width w. For each edge {c, d} ∈ E,
we do the following: Because {c, d} is an edge, there exists a bag containing both c and d
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , r} be minimum such that c, d ∈ Si.
If i = 1, then we can create a new bag S0 = S1 \ {d} and append it to the left of the
sequence, and the result is still a path decomposition. In this path decomposition, c appears
in bag |S0|, where |S0| 6 w since |S0| < |S1| 6 w + 1.
If i > 1, then one of c or d does not appear in Si−1, say d 6∈ Si−1. Then we can
create a new bag Si− 1
2
= Si \ {d}, and place it in between Si−1 and Si. The resulting
sequence is still a path decomposition, in which c appears in Si− 1
2
, with |Si− 1
2
| 6 w since
|Si− 1
2
| < |Si| 6 w + 1.
Clearly, the transformation described in the proof of Lemma 8.7 can be performed in
polynomial time. Since one can find some path decomposition in polynomial time, one can
find a path decomposition with the property of Lemma 8.7 in polynomial time.
Algorithm 6 Find a tree T ∈ T (P ) of minimum pathwidth
Let D = (C,A) be the attachment digraph of P
Let S1, . . . , Sr be a path decomposition of G(D| →C ) of minimum width w, satisfying the
condition of Lemma 8.7
f ← ∅, an attachment function under construction
for each c ∈ C \ {t} do
if c ∈ →C then
f(c)← d, for the unique d ∈ C with (c, d) ∈ A
else if c ∈ ⇒C then
Let d1, d2 ∈ →C be two forced vertices such that (d1, d2), (c, d1), (c, d2) ∈ A
(these exist by Proposition 7.13)
Since {d1, d2} is an edge of G(D| →C ), by the condition of Lemma 8.7,
there is a bag Si with di ∈ Si and |Si| 6 w, for some i ∈ {1, 2}
f(c)← di
Make a new bag Si+ 1
2
= Si ∪ {di} and place it to the right of Si
in the sequence of the path decomposition
return T ∗ = T (f)
Proposition 8.8. Algorithm 6 returns a tree T ∗ ∈ T (P ) with minimum pathwidth among
trees in T (P ) in polynomial time.
Proof. First, note that the path decomposition constructed by Algorithm 6 is in fact a path
decomposition of the output tree T (f): Each free vertex c ∈ ⇒C becomes a leaf in T (f), and
occurs in only a single bag Si in the constructed path decomposition. Since c is a leaf, it is
only a part of a single edge {c, f(c)}, and we have c, f(c) ∈ Si. Also, since c occurs in only
a single bag, the set of bags containing c is trivially an interval of the path decomposition
sequence.
Next, observe that the path decomposition of T (f) has the same width w as the pathwidth
of the forced part G(D| →C ), because all new bags have cardinality at most w + 1. Now,
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because G(D| →C ) is a subgraph of every T ∈ T (P ), no T ∈ T (P ) can have a smaller
pathwidth than G(D| →C ). Since Algorithm 6 identifies a tree T ∈ T (P ) with the same
pathwidth as G(D| →C ), this must be optimal.
8.6 Other Graph Types
Finally, we briefly collect some observations about recognising whether T (P ) contains trees
of certain types.
Paths If a profile is single-peaked on a path, then it is simply single-peaked. The literature
contains several algorithms for recognizing profiles that are single-peaked on a path. The
algorithms by Doignon and Falmagne (1994) and Escoffier et al. (2008) can be implemented to
run in time O(mn). One could also use some of the algorithms presented above. Algorithm 4
finds a tree T ∈ T (P ) with a minimum number of leaves; clearly, if T (P ) contains a path,
then this will be identified by the algorithm. Alternatively, Algorithm 5 can look for a
tree T ∈ T (P ) with maximum degree k = 2; this will succeed if and only if the profile is
single-peaked on a path. Both Algorithms 4 and 5 depend on pre-computing the attachment
digraph, which takes time O(m2n). Thus, this approach is slower than using the linear time
algorithms referred to above.
Stars In Proposition 6.1, we observed that a profile is single-peaked on a star graph if
and only if there is a candidate c ∈ C such that every voter ranks c in either first or second
condition. This condition can easily be verified in linear time, without needing to compute
the attachment digraph. Note that Algorithm 3 (minimizing the number of internal vertices)
will output a star whenever T (P ) contains a star graph.
Caterpillars Caterpillar graphs are exactly the trees of pathwidth 1 (Proskurowski &
Telle, 1999), and so Algorithm 6 can check whether a profile is single-peaked on a caterpillar.
One can also search for a caterpillar directly: first compute G(D| →C ) and check that it is a
caterpillar (if not, then no tree in T (P ) can be a caterpillar). If yes, then we can attach
every free vertex as a leaf to G(D| →C ), generating a caterpillar.
Subdivision of a Star A tree is a subdivision of a star if all but one vertex has degree
at most 2. We can find a subdivision of a star in T (P ), should one exist, by adapting
Algorithm 5: we guess the center of the subdivision of the star, and then appropriately
assign upper bounds on the vertex degrees by appropriately setting the capacity constrains
in the flow network.
9. Hardness of Recognizing Single-Peakedness on a Specific Tree
The algorithms presented in Section 8 enable us to answer a wide range of questions about
the set T (P ). The NP-hardness results in this section, however, show that not every such
question can be answered efficiently unless P = NP.
Two graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) are isomorphic if there is a bijection φ :
V1 → V2 such that for all u, v ∈ V1, we have that {u, v} ∈ E1 if and only if {φ(u), φ(v)} ∈ E2;
we write G1 ∼= G2 whenever this is the case. We consider the following computational
problem.
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Single-Peaked Tree Labelling
Instance: Profile P over C, a tree T0 on |C| vertices
Question: Is there a tree T = (C,E) such that T ∼= T0 and P is single-peaked on T?
In this problem, we are given a ‘template’ unlabeled tree T0, and need to decide whether
we can label the vertices in this template by candidates so as to make the input profile
single-peaked on the resulting labeled tree. For example, if T0 is a path, then the problem is
to decide whether the profile P is single-peaked on a path, and in this case the problem is
easy to solve. However, the template T0 occurs in the input to the decision problem, and it
is not clear how to proceed in checking whether T0 ‘fits’ into the attachment digraph. In
fact, as we now show, this problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 9.1. The problem Single-Peaked Tree Labelling is NP-complete even if T0
is restricted to diameter at most four.
Proof. The problem is in NP since for a given T and a given isomorphism φ, we can easily
check that φ is an isomorphism and that the profile single-peaked on T .
For the hardness proof, we reduce from x3c. Suppose we are given an x3c-instance with
ground set X = {x1, . . . , xp} with p = 3p′ and a collection Y = {Y1, . . . , Yq} of 3-element
subsets of X. We then construct an instance of Single-Peaked Tree Labelling as
follows. First, we construct a tree T0 with vertex set C0 = {a, b1, . . . , bq−p′ , c1, . . . , cp′}∪{di,j :
1 6 i 6 p′, 1 6 j 6 3}, and edge set E0 = {{a, bi} : 1 6 i 6 q − p′} ∪ {{a, ci} : 1 6 i 6
p′} ∪ {{ci, di,j} : 1 6 i 6 p′, 1 6 j 6 3}. The resulting tree is drawn below; clearly it has
diameter 4.
b1 b2 b3 . . . bi . . . bq−p′
a
c1 c2 . . . cp′
d1,1 d1,2 d1,3 d2,1 d2,2 d2,3 . . . dp′,1 dp′,2 dp′,3
Next, we construct a profile P with |N | = p + q voters on the candidate set C =
{z, x1, . . . , xp, y1, . . . , yq}. P will contain one vote for each object and one vote for each set.
In the following, all indifferences can be broken arbitrarily. For each object xi, we add a
voter vxi :
z  {yj : Yj 3 xi}  xi  {yj : Yj 63 xi}  X \ {xi}.
(This voter will force xi to be attached to z or to a set containing xi.) For each set Yj , we
add a voter vYj :
z  yj  {yj : j = 1, . . . , q} \ {yj}  X.
(This voter will force an edge from z to yj .)
This completes the description of the reduction. We now prove that it is correct.
Suppose the x3c-instance is a ‘yes’-instance, and let Y ′ = {Yj1 , . . . , Yjp′} be a cover with
p′ sets. Then we build a labelling isomorphism φ : C0 → C as follows: We put φ(a) = z. For
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each Yj ∈ Y ′, we take one of the bi’s and set φ(bi) = yj . For each Yj 6∈ Y ′, we take one of
the ci’s and set φ(ci) = yj . Finally, for each xk ∈ X, we find Yj ∈ Y ′ with xi ∈ Yj . Write
bi = φ
−1(yj), then take one of the di,j ’s and set φ(di,j) = xk. The resulting labeled tree T is
shown below. It is easy to check that the profile P is single-peaked on T .
yjm+1 yjm+2 yjm+3 . . . yjr . . . yjn
z
yj1 yj2 . . . yjp′
xi1 xi2 xi3 xi4 xi5 xi6 . . . xip−2 xip−1 xip
Conversely, suppose that there is a labelling T of T0 so that P single-peaked on T . Let
φ : C0 → C is a witnessing isomorphism. Note that the vertex labeled z must have degree at
least q, because for each j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, voter vYj can only be single-peaked on T if z and yj
are adjacent in T . There is only one such vertex in T , namely φ(a), and hence φ(a) = z. The
vertex φ(a) has exactly q neighbors, which then must all be labeled by some yj . Exactly p
′
of the q neighbors of φ(a) have degree 4. Let Y ′ = {Yj ∈ Y : yj = φ(ci) for some 1 6 i 6 p′}
be the collection of the p′ sets occupying the vertices with degree 4. We claim that Y ′ is a
cover. Let xi ∈ X; it must be a leaf of T because all internal vertices of T have already been
labeled otherwise. Then, because vxi is single-peaked on T , the set {z, x} ∪ {yj : Yj 3 xi}
must be connected in T , so the neighbor of the leaf xi must be a member of that set. But
xi cannot be a neighbor of z, so z is a neighbor of some yj where x ∈ Yj . This implies that
yj is the label of a degree-4 vertex. Hence Yj ∈ Y ′, and so xi is covered by Y ′.
By copying the center vertex and adding some peripheral vertices, we can adjust this
reduction to show that the problem remains hard even if T0’s maximum degree is three.
Notice that the problem is (trivially) fixed-parameter tractable with parameter k = |C| by
trying all k! possible labelings of the input tree.
In the appendix, by modifying this reduction, we show that is also NP-complete to
decide whether a given preference profile is single-peaked on a regular tree (i.e., a tree where
all internal vertices have the same degree). This hardness result complements the positive
results of Section 8.
10. Conclusions
Without any restrictions on the structure of voters’ preferences, winner determination
under the Chamberlin–Courant rule is NP-hard. Positive results have been obtained when
preferences are assumed to be single-peaked, and we studied whether these results can be
extended to preferences that are single-peaked on a tree. For the egalitarian variant of the
rule, we showed that winner determination remains polynomial-time solvable for any tree
and any scoring function. For the utilitarian setting, we show that winner determination
is hard for general preferences single-peaked on a tree, but we find positive results when
imposing additional restrictions. One algorithm we present runs in polynomial time when
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preferences are single-peaked on a tree which has a constant number of leaves, and another
runs efficiently on a tree with a small number of internal vertices. It would also be interesting
to see whether our easiness results for preferences that are single-peaked on a tree extend to
the egalitarian version of Monroe’s rule. Betzler et al. (2013) show that this rule becomes
easy for preferences single-peaked on a path, but their argument is much more intricate
than for egalitarian Chamberlin–Courant.
To make our parameterized winner determination algorithms more applicable, we have
also studied the recognition problem in detail. We have designed polynomial-time algorithms
for recognizing profiles that are single-peaked on special classes of trees. One can interpret
some of these algorithms as deciding whether the input profile is close to being single-peaked
on a path, in the sense of being single-peaked on a tree which is similar to a path (for
example, having small pathwidth). This is an alternative view on a recent literature about
almost-structured preferences which has studied various distance measures (Faliszewski et al.,
2014; Erdelyi et al., 2017; Bredereck et al., 2016; Cornaz et al., 2012).
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Appendix A. Hardness of Utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant for
Low-Degree Trees
Here we modify the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4.1 to establish that Utilitarian
CC remains hard on trees of maximum degree 3.
Theorem A.1. Given a profile P that is single-peaked on a tree with maximum degree 3,
a target committee size k, and a target score B, it is NP-complete to decide whether there
exists a committee of size k with score at least B under the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant
rule with the Borda scoring function.
Proof. We will provide a reduction from the classic Vertex Cover problem. Given an
instance (G, t) of Vertex Cover such that G = (V,E), V = {u1, . . . , up} and E =
{e1, . . . , eq}, we construct an instance of Utilitarian CC as follows.
Let M = 5p2q; intuitively, M is a large number. We introduce three candidates ai, yi
and zi for each vertex ui ∈ V , and M dummy candidates. Formally, we set A = {a1, . . . , ap},
Y = {y1, . . . , yp}, Z = {z1, . . . , zp}, D = {d1, . . . , dM}, and define the candidate set to be
C = A ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪D. We set the target committee size to be k = p+ t.
We now introduce the voters, who will come in three types N = N1 ∪N2 ∪N3.
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N1 N2 N3
5pq · · · 5pq 1 · · · 1 M · · · M
y1 yp A A z1 zp
z1 zp yj1,1 yjq,1 y1 yp
A A yj1,2 yjq,2 A A
D D D D D D
...
...
...
...
...
...
• The set N1 consists of 5pq identical voters for each ui ∈ V : they rank yi first, zi second,
and ai third, followed by other candidates:
yi  zi  ai  ai+1  · · ·  ap  ai−1  · · ·  a1  d1  · · ·  dM  · · ·
• The set N2 consists of a single voter for each edge ej ∈ E: this voter ranks candidates
in A first (as a1  · · ·  ap), followed by the two candidates from Y that correspond
to the endpoints of ej (in an arbitrary order), followed by the dummy candidates
d1, . . . , dM , followed by all other candidates as specified below. The purpose of these
voters is to ensure that every edge is covered by one of the vertices that correspond to
a committee member, and to incur a heavy penalty of M if the edge is uncovered.
• The set N3 is a set of M identical voters for each ui ∈ V who all rank zi first and yi
second:
zi  yi  ai  ai+1  · · ·  ap  aj−1  · · ·  a1  d1  · · ·  dM  · · ·
We complete the voters’ preferences so that the resulting profile is single-peaked on the
following tree:
a1 · · · ap d1 · · · dM
y1 · · · yp
z1 · · · zp
This tree is obtained by starting with a path through A and D, and then attaching yi as a
leaf onto ai and zi as a leaf onto yi for every i = 1, . . . , p. Note that the resulting tree has
maximum degree 3. It remains to specify how to complete each vote in our profile to ensure
that the resulting profile is single-peaked on this tree. Inspecting the tree, we see that it
suffices to ensure that for each i = 1, . . . , p it holds that in all votes where the positions of
yi and zi is not given explicitly, candidate yi is ranked above zi.
This completes the construction of the profile P with voter set N and candidate set C.
We set the utility bound to be B = −(5pq)(p − t) − q(p + 1) (note that by construction,
−M < B).
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Intuitively, the ‘correct committee’ we have in mind consists of all zi candidates (of
which there are p) and a selection of yi candidates that corresponds to a vertex cover
(of which there should be t), should a vertex cover of size t exist. This completes the
description of our instance of the Utilitarian CC problem with the Borda scoring function
s = (0,−1,−2, . . . ). Now let us prove that the reduction is correct.
Suppose we have started with a ‘yes’-instance of Vertex Cover, and let S be a collection
of t vertices that form a vertex cover of G. Consider the committee W = Z ∪ {yi : ui ∈ S};
note that |W | = p+ t = k. The voters in N3 and 5pqt voters in N1 have their most-preferred
candidate in W , so they obtain a Borda score of 0. For the remaining (5pq)(p− t) voters
in N1, their score under W is −1, since zi ∈W for all i. Further, each voter in N2 obtains
a score of at least −(p + 1). Indeed, the candidates that correspond to the endpoints
of the respective edge are ranked in positions p + 1 and p + 2 in this voter’s ranking,
and since S is a vertex cover for G, one of these candidates is in S. We conclude that
m+µ (P,W ) > −(5pq)(p− t)− q(p+ 1) = B.
Conversely, suppose there exists a committee W of size k = p+ t with m+µ (P,W ) > B.
Note first that W has to contain all candidates in Z: otherwise, there are M voters
in N3 with utility at most −1, and then the utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant score of
W is at most −M < B. Thus Z ⊆ W . We will now argue that W \ Z is a subset
of Y , and that S′ = {ui : yi ∈ W \ Z} is a vertex cover of G. Suppose that W \ Z
contains too few candidates from Y , i.e., at most t − 1 candidates from Y . Then N1
contains at least (5pq)(p− (t− 1)) voters who contribute at most −1 to the score of W , so
m+µ (P,W ) 6 −(5pq)(p− t+ 1) < −(5pq)(p− t)− q(p+ 1) = B, a contradiction. Thus, we
have W \ Z ⊆ Y . Now, suppose that S′ is not a vertex cover for G. Let ej ∈ E be an edge
that is not covered by S′, and consider the voter in N2 corresponding to ej . Clearly, none
of the candidates ranked in positions 1, . . . , p + 2 + M by this voter appear in W . Thus,
this voter contributes less than −M to the score of W , so the total score of W is less than
−M < B, a contradiction. Thus, a ‘yes’-instance of Utilitarian CC corresponds to a
‘yes’-instance of Vertex Cover.
Appendix B. Hardness of Utilitarian Chamberlin–Courant for Stars
For the Borda scoring function, we have seen in Theorem 4.1 that Utilitarian CC is
NP-complete for trees of diameter 4, but in Section 6 we have seen that Utilitarian CC
is easy for stars (of diameter 2). The algorithm that worked for stars uses the specific
properties of the Borda scoring function. In this section, we show that there are other
positional scoring functions for which Utilitarian CC remains hard even on stars.
Recall from Proposition 6.1 that a profile P is single-peaked on a star if and only if there
is a candidate c such that for every i ∈ N , either top(i) = c or second(i) = c.
Theorem B.1. Utilitarian CC is NP-hard even for profiles that are single-peaked on a
star. The hardness result holds for any family of positional scoring functions whose scoring
vectors s satisfy s1 = 0, s2 = · · · = s` < 0, s`+1 < s` for some ` > 5.
Proof. We will reduce from the restricted version of Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C) to
our problem. Recall that an instance of X3C is given by a ground set X and a collection Y
of size-3 subsets of X; it is a ‘yes’-instance if there is a subcollection Y ′ ⊆ Y of size |X|/3
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such that each element of X appears in exactly one set in Y ′. This problem is NP-hard;
moreover it remains NP-hard even if each element of X appears in at most three sets in Y
(Garey & Johnson, 1979).
Fix a family of positional scoring functions µ that satisfy the condition in the statement
of the theorem for some ` > 5. For brevity, we write −s = s2 and −S = s`+1.
Given an instance (X,Y) of X3C such that |{Yj ∈ Y : xi ∈ Yj}| 6 3 for each xi ∈ X,
we construct an instance of our problem as follows. We set Y = {y1, . . . , yq}, and let
C = {a, z} ∪X ∪ Y ∪D, where D = {di,j}j=1,...,`i=1,...,p is a set of dummy candidates. For each
Yj ∈ Y we construct p+1 voters who rank yj first, a second and z third, followed by all other
candidates in an arbitrary order; let N1 denote the set of voters constructed in this way.
Further, for each xi ∈ X, we construct a voter who ranks xi first, followed by a, followed
by the candidates yj such that xi ∈ Yj (in an arbitrary order), followed by di,1, . . . , di,`,
followed by all other candidates in an arbitrary order. Denote the resulting set of voters
by N2. Finally, let N3 be a set of (p+ 1)(q + 1) voters who all rank z first and a second,
followed by all other candidates in an arbitrary order. Set B = −s((p+ 1)(q − p′) + p) and
k = p′ + 1. This completes the description of our instance of the Utilitarian CC problem.
Observe that every voter in N ranks a second, so by Proposition 6.1 the constructed profile
in single-peaked on a star.
Suppose we have started with a ‘yes’-instance of X3C, and let Y ′ be a collection of p′
many subsets that cover X. Set W = {z} ∪ {yj : Yj ∈ Y ′}. Clearly, all voters in N3 and
(p+ 1)p′ voters in N1 are perfectly represented by W and so obtain a score of 0. For the
remaining voters in N1 their score under W is −s = s3, since z ∈W . Further, for each voter
in N2, his score under W is at least −s = s5. Indeed, suppose that this voter ranks some
xi ∈ X first. Then he ranks the candidates yj such that xi ∈ Yj in positions 5 or higher.
Since Y ′ is a cover of X, at least one of these candidates appears in W . We conclude that
m+µ (P,W ) > −s((p+ 1)(q − p′) + p) = B.
Conversely, suppose there exist a committee W of size p′ + 1 such that m+µ (P,W ) > B.
Note first that W has to contain z: otherwise, for each voter in N3 the score is at most −s,
and the total score of W is at most −s|N3| < B. We will now argue that W \ {z} is a subset
of Y and that Y ′′ = {Yj : yj ∈W \ {z}} is an exact cover of X. Suppose first that W \ {z}
contains at most p′ − 1 candidates from Y . Then N1 contains at least (p+ 1)(q − p′ + 1)
voters whose score under W is at most −s, so m+µ (P,W ) 6 −s(p + 1)(q − p′ + 1) < B, a
contradiction. Thus, we have W \ {z} ⊆ Y . Now, suppose that Y ′′ is not an exact cover
of X, let xi be an element of X that is not covered by Y ′′, and consider the voter in N2
that ranks xi first. Clearly, none of the candidates ranked in positions 1, . . . , ` by this voter
appear in W . Thus, the score of this voter under W is at most −S. For all other voters in
N2 their score under W is at most −s. Further, there are (p+ 1)(q − p′) voters in N2 who
are not perfectly represented by W . We conclude that the total score under W is at most
−s((p+ 1)(q−p′) + (p−1))−S < B, a contradiction. Thus, a ‘yes’-instance of Utilitarian
CC corresponds to a ‘yes’-instance of X3C.
Appendix C. Hardness of Recognizing Preferences Single-Peaked on
Regular Trees
Recall that a tree is k-regular if every non-leaf vertex has degree k.
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Theorem C.1. Given a profile P , it is NP-complete to decide whether P is single-peaked
on a regular tree, i.e., whether there exists a positive integer k such that P is single-peaked
on a k-regular tree. The problem is also hard for each fixed k > 4.
Proof. The problem is in NP since for a given k-regular tree T we can easily check whether
it makes the profile single-peaked on T .
We start by giving a hardness proof for fixed k = 4, and later explain how to handle the
cases for other fixed k and non-fixed k.
We again reduce from x3c. Suppose we are given an x3c-instance with objects x1, . . . , xp
with p = 3p′ and sets Y1, . . . , Yq. We construct a profile over the following candidates. Let
X = {x1, . . . , xp}. Let S = {s0, s1, . . . , sq, sq+1}. Let L = {l1, . . . , lq}. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yq}.
Then our candidate set will be X ∪ S ∪ L ∪ Y ; that is, there is one candidate per element
xi, three candidates sj , lj , yj for each set Yj , and two further candidates s0 and sq+1. The
candidate yj represents the set Yj . We now introduce the voters. (Look at the picture of
the intended tree below to make sense of these votes.)
First, we force (s0, s1, . . . , sq, sq+1) to form a path. For this, we need to force that
(si, si+1) is an edge, for each i = 0, . . . , q:
si, si+1, si+2, . . . , sq+1, si−1, . . . , s1, s0, Y, L,X
We also force s0 and sq+1 to be leaves:
s1, . . . , sq+1, Y, L,X, s0
s0, . . . , sq, Y, L,X, sq+1
Further, we force each lj ∈ L and each xi ∈ X to be a leaf:
S, Y, L \ {lj}, X, lj
S, Y, L,X \ {xi}, xi
Now, lj and yj need to have an edge to sj :
lj , sj , sj+1, . . . , sq+1, sj−1, . . . , s0, Y, L \ {lj}, X
yj , sj , sj+1, . . . , sq+1, sj−1, . . . , s0, Y \ {yj}, L,X
Finally, xi needs to be attached to one of the sets containing it (or to S, but this will never
happen):
S, {yj : xi ∈ Yj}, xi, {other yj}, L,X \ {xi}. (2)
This concludes the description of the reduction. We now prove it is correct.
If there is a valid partition in the x3c-instance selecting precisely the sets yj1 , . . . , yjp′ ,
then the constructed profile is single-peaked on the 4-regular tree on the candidate set with
the following edges E (see picture below): {si, si+1} ∈ E for all i = 0, . . . , q; {lj , sj} ∈ E
for all j; {yj , sj} ∈ E for all j; {xi, yji} ∈ E for all xi, where yji corresponds to the set
containing xi in the x3c-solution. By considering top-initial segments of the votes given
above, we see that this choice makes all votes single-peaked on this tree.
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l1 l2 l3 . . . lq−2 lq−1 lq
s0 s1 s2 s3 . . . sq−2 sq−1 sq sq+1
y1 y2 y3 . . . yq−2 yq−1 yq
xi1 xi2 xi3 xi4 xi5 xi6 xip−2 xip−1 xip
Conversely, suppose there is a 4-regular tree T = (C,E) that makes all the votes single-
peaked. We show that then there must be an x3c-solution. By the remarks we made
when introducing the voters, we already know that {si, si+1} ∈ E for all i = 0, . . . , q; and
{lj , sj} ∈ E for all j. Further, we know that the following vertices are all leaves of T : s0,
sq+1, all lj ∈ L, and all xi ∈ X. Hence, the only thing we do not yet know is who the
neighbor of xi is, for each xi. Certainly, these neighbors cannot be themselves leaves, so
only vertices from S or Y are plausible candidates. But each non-leaf sj already has 4
neighbors in T (namely sj−1, sj+1, lj , yj), and so since T is 4-regular, xi cannot also be its
neighbor. Thus xi’s neighbor must be a yj . Looking at the last type 2 of vote introduced in
this reduction, we see that each xi must be attached to a yj corresponding to a set Yj 3 xi.
On the other hand, by 4-regularity, each yj is either connected to 0 or to 3 xi’s with xi ∈ Yj .
Hence this tree encodes a solution to the x3c-instance.
For other fixed values of k > 5, we can run this reduction from the problem exact
cover by (k − 1)-sets, which is also NP-hard, and copy the set L produced above k − 3
times.
If the value of k is not fixed, we can do the following (see picture): Prepend s−1 to the
path S (where now s−1 is forced to be a leaf, but s0 is not), and introduce new leaves a and
b which must be attached to s0. Modify the votes 2 in such a way that xi can be attached
to s1, . . . , sq or an appropriate yj , but not to s0. Then any regular tree on which the profile
is single-peaked will need to be 4-regular, due to s0 having degree 4, and otherwise the
argument above goes through.
a l1 . . .
s−1 s0 s1 . . .
b y1 . . .
xi1 xi2 xi3
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